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> context • In this article we match machine learning (ML) and interactive machine learning (iML) with radical con-
structivism (RC) to build a tentative radical constructivist framework for iML; we then present a pilot study in which 
RC-framed iML is applied to assistive robotics, namely upper-limb prosthetics (myocontrol). > problem • Despite more 
than 40 years of academic research, myocontrol is still unsolved, with rejection rates of up to 75%. This is mainly due to 
its unreliability – the inability to correctly predict the patient’s intent in daily life. > method • We propose a description 
of the typical problems posed by ML-based myocontrol through the lingo of RC, highlighting the advantages of such 
a modelisation. We abstract some aspects of RC and project them onto the concepts of ML, to make it evolve into the 
concept of RC-framed iML. > results • Such a projection leads to the design and development of a myocontrol system 
based upon RC-framed iML, used to foster the co-adaptation of human and prosthesis. The iML-based myocontrol sys-
tem is then compared to a traditional ML-based one in a pilot study involving human participants in a goal-reaching 
task mimicking the control of a prosthetic hand and wrist. > implications • We argue that the usage of RC-framed 
iML in myocontrol could be of great help to the community of assistive robotics, and that the constructivist perspec-
tive can lead to principled design of the system itself, as well as of the training/calibration/co-adaptation procedure. 
> constructivist content • Ernst von Glasersfeld’s RC is the leading principle pushing for the usage of RC-framed iML; it 
also provides guidelines for the design of the system, the human/machine interface, the experiments and the experi-
mental setups. > Key words • Machine learning, interactive machine learning, radical constructivism, assistive robotics, 
human-machine interaction, co-adaptation.
introduction
« 1 » according to arthur samuel 
(1959), machine learning (ML from now on) 
is “the subfield of computer science that […] 
gives computers the ability to learn without 
being explicitly programmed.” Can radical 
constructivism say something useful about 
machine learning, something which would 
enrich its capabilities, our understanding of 
it, and possibly shed light on learning tout 
court?
« 2 » First of all, what is machine learn-
ing? For the benefit of those readers start-
ing from a realist perspective, let us look at 
it, at least initially, using a realist language. 
samuel’s definition is to some extent cor-
rect: indeed, ML is an “explicit program,” 
since it runs on computers, and today’s 
computers must still be programmed in the 
old-fashioned way; but it is a program that 
observes statistical regularities in the world 
and matches them against one another.
« 3 » as a direct consequence of this, 
the output of ML will sometimes not match 
our expectations, i.e., “it will do the wrong 
thing,” and not as the result of a bug. This, as 
a realist statistician would put it, “is due to 
the uncertainty inherent to statistics – one 
can never be statistically sure that something 
is true.” or, as a hypothetical realist (the 
most common sub-type of realism among 
the ML community) would put it: “statistical 
truth is only true most of the times.” There-
fore, a program that searches for statistical 
similarities in the world will now and then, 
e.g., deem as similar two things which the 
researcher defines as not belonging to the 
same category, and vice versa. This is correct 
and must be accepted, as opposed to bugs 
in standard programming, which are always 
bad and must be eliminated.
« 4 » The only way to “debug” an ML 
program is to show it more exemplary regu-
larities – to “teach” it something more about 
the world – to enrich its own model of how 
the world works – to help it to better orga-
nise its own private world according to the 
researcher’s idea of the world.
« 5 » More concretely, ML builds a 
mathematical function (a “model” from now 
on) approximating the observable behavior 
of some variables of an unknown process of 
interest, given some very basic restrictions 
on the shape of the model itself, and a set of 
examples – a set of input data (values of the 
variables) and corresponding target values 
to which each datum is associated, sampled 
from the process itself. This set represents 
the regularities so far observed during the 
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past behavior of the process. The model, 
which compactly represents them, can be 
used to predict the future behavior of the 
process (an excellent introductory text is 
shalev-shwartz & Ben-david 2014).
« 6 » For instance, an ML model can be 
built using a set of images acquired from a 
street camera and corresponding (face-yes/
face-no) values, denoting whether an im-
age contains a human face or not. after the 
model has been built, will it correctly iden-
tify new images as containing/not contain-
ing a face? another example: an ML model 
of the temperature of the Mediterranean sea 
can be built using a set of temperature values 
and the times at which they were observed.
Will the temperature of the Mediterranean 
at specific future times be correctly predict-
ed by the model?
« 7 » Mathematically speaking, the mod-
el is built by minimising a cost functional as-
sociated to the examples. it is an optimal fit 
of the examples, naturally endowed with the 
ability to both compactly explain the past tar-
get values for each known input datum, and 
to approximate target values associated with 
so-far-unseen input data. The model is there-
fore an attempt to “make sense” of the exam-
ples, to “organise” them, to use them in order 
to predict the future behavior of the process.
« 8 » it obviously follows that the qual-
ity of the model (its predictive power) de-
pends on how much the samples collected 
so far are representative of the behavior of 
the process both in the past and in the fu-
ture. so, the answer to the questions posed 
in §6 is “yes, provided that a good set of ex-
amples was collected in the beginning.”
« 9 » notice that the minimisation of a 
cost functional is a completely mechanical 
procedure; moreover, no a priori physical 
knowledge about the process to be modelled 
is, in principle, required – only the ability 
to draw examples from it. in this sense, an 
ML model is indeed a machine that “learns 
without being explicitly programmed” – a 
softer, perhaps more flexible way of telling 
our computers what to do, than program-
ming. and the idea is a winning one: ML has 
recently (at least to some remarkable extent) 
solved problems that were considered be-
yond the reach of computers, e.g., form de-
tection in pictures, automated medical diag-
nosis, speech recognition, content analysis 
of a text, the game of Go, etc. so far, so good.
is machine learning 
a radical constructivist 
business?
« 10 » a great deal of the research in ML 
seems to suffer from a methodological weak-
ness: machine learning tends to be used as 
a number-crunching black box, at which to 
throw as many examples as possible, hoping 
that it will yield a usable relationship between 
input data and target values. too often, scarce 
attention is paid to the quality, the origin and 
the meaning of the examples (e.g., Wagstaff 
2012). Moreover, examples are considered to 
be “the reality,” rather than being considered 
artefacts manufactured by the researcher’s 
explicit or implicit choices. The whole proce-
dure suffers from an insufficient awareness of 
the epistemological problem.1
« 11 » This weakness stems, in our opin-
ion, from a widespread realist attitude to 
knowledge and learning, in statistics in gen-
eral and in ML in particular. a “realist stat-
istician,” we can say, assumes that “there is 
a world out there” and that “we can build a 
real, even if somewhat rough, model of this 
world.” once such a model is built, no fur-
ther changes are needed. in the case of ML, 
the example set represents knowledge about 
the world out there, given at the beginning of 
time, used to predict the future evolution of 
the target process.
« 12 » in one sentence, ML is so far 
prevalently a realist love affair, for realist stat-
isticians. But even a realist statistician (and 
those who adopt some form of realism) may 
observe that there are indeed many cases 
in which this attitude will fail; in particular, 
it will fail whenever too few examples are 
available, e.g., because they are expensive to 
collect, or if the process of interest is non-sta-
tionary, implying that the examples collected 
at the beginning of time will at some point no 
longer represent its behavior.
« 13 » Thus, we propose to shift the atti-
tude to ML from realist to radical constructiv-
ist, as radical constructivism (RC from now 
on) is defined by Ernst von Glasersfeld (e.g., 
Glasersfeld 1983, 1995).
1 | deep learning coupled with big data rep-
resents an unfortunate push in this very direction, 
albeit a very successful one from a practical point 
of view.
« 14 » There are at least four remarks sug-
gesting such a change in paradigm to a realist 
ML researcher.
« 15 » In the first place, let us notice that if 
we strip the concept of ML to the bare bones, 
all we are left with (§5) is an agent that tries to 
organise perceptual objects, obtained through 
specific sensory channels, as best as it can. 
no physical, chemical, mathematical, onto-
logical, …, knowledge about the process of 
interest is required. This means that in ML, 
no knowledge of “external reality” need be as-
sumed. ML deals only with “perceptual” data. 
This is a very radical-constructivist concept 
(Glasersfeld 1995: 58f) that we call in short 
“the construction of experiential reality.”
« 16 » In the second place, ML is about 
matching “perceptual” patterns – finding 
regularities among subsets of examples, com-
pactly representing these regularities and 
using them to predict new target values (§5 
again). That is what an ML model does.2 not 
incidentally, matching perceptual patterns is 
also one of the foundations of RC: “learning 
as a constructive activity” (Glasersfeld 1983).
« 17 » Thirdly, consider again the real-
ist attitude to ML (§11): as opposed to the 
realist statistician, for the RC statistician in-
deed “there is a world out there,” but as well 
“we cannot build a real model of this world 
– we can only build a viable representation 
of it (one of the many possible), useful to 
do something specific in it” (utilitarianism) 
and in agreement with our pre-conceptions 
of this world (conceptual coherence). We are 
continually forced to test the viability of this 
representation, for our specific purposes and 
according to our pre-knowledge, through our 
interaction with the world. The value of an 
idea of the world is measured in term of fit-
ness to achieve a specific goal and (better) fit-
ness against other ideas the subject has about 
the world, not in term of the correspondence 
between the idea and a mind-independent 
reality (Glasersfeld 1995: 68f). We say in this 
case, that viability is utilitarianism plus con-
ceptual coherence.
« 18 » Fourthly, “pre-knowledge and 
learning.” The realist attitude to ML assumes 
that knowledge is free from pre-knowledge. 
The radical-constructivist attitude, as op-
posed to that, contends that knowledge – 
2 | actually, pattern matching or pattern rec-
ognition is the old umbrella term for ML.
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every possible segmentation of the percep-
tive field – depends on, and is shaped by, the 
subject’s pre-definition of what can be seen 
in the perceptive field, and that this pre-def-
inition is shaped, in turn, by the interaction 
the subject has had with the others and with 
the world (learning). Furthermore, accord-
ing to RC, the subject does not interact with 
the other (and the other’s signals), but only 
and exclusively with her perception of the 
other (and of the other’s signals) and with 
her previous personal ideas of the other and 
of the world, since human beings cannot ac-
cess the “real world” (a mind-independent 
reality) but only their perception of the world. 
This is a very different model of interaction 
from the realist one
« 19 » Particularly, during interaction 
with the others, the subject
a recognizes a specific situation according 
to her memorized “schemata,”
b performs a specific activity associated 
with the situation, and
c checks her own specific expectations 
that that activity should produce a spe-
cific previously experienced result.
if this does not happen, the subject is per-
turbed and forced to review her initial sen-
sory elements to find a new structure in these 
sensory elements and eliminate the perturba-
tion. All these processes are presumed to be 
subjective and internal to the cognizing agent 
(again, Glasersfeld 1995: 68f). so, an ML en-
gineer will endow her ML system with an 
initial simple set of schemata (pre-education) 
and an engine to apply these schemata, hav-
ing expectations, possibly to be disconfirmed, 
and trying to reshape her sensory material 
(learning). This actually is, and we can call it 
in short, “von Glasersfeld’s learning theory.”
« 20 » Therefore, an RC statistician en-
gaged in ML would, as opposed to her realist 
colleague,
a collect examples according to her cul-
tural pre-conception of the world,
b build a temporarily viable model of the 
world – viable according to her own ex-
plicit or implicit goals and pre-assump-
tions/pre-definitions of the world,
c have expectations and check how well 
the model works, and if the response is 
not good, she would
d try to reorganize the examples and/or 
collect new ones, with which to update 
the model – go back to step (a).
From a (realist) engineer’s perspective, this 
endless loop aims at countering the poten-
tial non-stationarity of the process to be 
modelled.
« 21 » From what we have said so far, it 
almost appears as if ML already were an RC 
business. in order to complete the picture 
though, we also need to enforce the loop 
outlined in §§19f – we need the ability to 
have expectations and update the model at 
any time, specifically whenever it does no 
longer reflect the expectations about the 
underlying process or the system’s goals – 
whenever its predictive power has become 
unsatisfactory. updating a model means 
changing it in order for it to accommodate 
old and new knowledge – to accommodate 
new examples, gathered on demand without 
the need to obliterate all past knowledge. 
(notice that sometimes some of the past 
knowledge must be forgotten, but it is es-
sential not to be forced to forget it upon up-
dating!) Model updates must be triggered by 
some kind of feedback from the world con-
firming or perturbing the model, perhaps 
an external agent, able to judge the model’s 
current performance, on the basis of some 
well-defined purpose.
« 22 » although little practiced (and 
even less theoretically studied) in ML lit-
erature, this idea already exists and is called, 
not incidentally, interactive machine learning 
(iML from now on). iML adds to standard 
ML the possibility of being helped by an ex-
ternal agent, recognising that the predictive 
power of the current model has become in-
sufficient, and that a new data gathering and 
model update is required. iML, so far, has 
been tested in conditions that are particu-
larly hard for standard ML, such as recog-
nising the presence of complex structures in 
an image: whenever the model failed to cor-
rectly categorise an image, a human opera-
tor would weigh in, give the system a further 
example, and request a model update.
« 23 » interestingly, iML has recently 
been linked to (non-radical) constructivism 
by adavait sarkar, who claims that
“ the interaction loop of interactive machine 
learning systems facilitates constructivist learn-
ing, as it maximises the interaction between the 
end-user’s experience of the model, and their 
ideas regarding the model status.” (sarkar 2016: 
1472)
However, this is, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the only case so far in which these 
two fields have talked to each other. This, 
although iML has been used and implicitly 
defined in a number of cases (for instance, 
in Fails & olsen 2003; iturrate et al. 2015; 
strazzulla et al. 2017). some recently re-
vamped ML approaches, e.g., recurrent neu-
ral networks, can even be viewed as “interac-
tive in nature”; to the best of our knowledge, 
however, a coherent conceptual framework 
about interactivity in ML is still missing, and 
this is where RC can help.
« 24 » in practice, interactivity is en-
forced through incrementality. an incre-
mental ML system is precisely an ML system 
that allows for updating/downdating its cur-
rent model. The good news is that, in prin-
ciple, any standard ML system can easily be 
turned into an incremental one by storing 
the examples seen up to now, and whenev-
er a model update is (somehow) triggered, 
adding the new examples to the old ones, 
selecting the examples of interest from the 
new example set, and then re-building the 
model from scratch using the selected ex-
amples only.3
« 25 » to some extent iML, as enforced 
so far in literature, already smells like RC; 
but this generally remains an intuition of 
the researcher – there is no adoption of a 
theory of knowledge and learning as RC. it 
is interaction conceived as a realist scientist 
can conceive it (sometime as an anti-theo-
retical scientist can conceive it). actually, 
through the interaction, the iML system, in 
the intention of a realist scientist, builds a 
“true” model of reality (this way bypassing 
the problem of a changing reality) simply by 
“adding input data.” We claim that adding 
to this an epistemological awareness and a 
more robust learning theory, as offered by 
RC, will open new paths of research and 
technological improvement.
« 26 » our argumentation shows that 
in the end it will be useful to adopt an RC-
framed iML. The tentative framework we 
sketched above is an attempt at opening a 
discussion between the RC community and 
the ML community to enrich our idea of 
RC-framed iML.
3 | This solution can be computationally/
memory intensive but there are ways around the 
problem in the majority of the cases of interest.
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radical constructivist 
machine learning in action
« 27 » This new point of view of an RC-
framed iML raises the question: what is it 
useful for? an immediate, almost trivial 
idea (also inspired by the definition of iML 
in§§22f), is that human-machine interaction 
should be the typical problem area in which 
ML, and iML, can be empowered by RC.
« 28 » a second, perhaps less immedi-
ate way of empowering ML with RC consists 
in empowering the statistical analytical tools 
behind ML with the ideas outlined in §§15f, 
e.g., giving the ML system a “set of schema-
ta” (a sort of “culture”), some pre-selectors 
to segment its perceptive field, to pre-treat/
pre-interpret the information it will crunch 
and match (to have some “expectations” on 
the world and the possibility of being “per-
turbed”). We can call this pathway “crunch 
before match.”4
« 29 » We talk about human-machine 
interaction whenever a human subject must 
guide, teach, control a machine (a robot, a 
computer, a virtual avatar, etc.) that is en-
dowed with only limited autonomy (Card, 
newell & Moran 1983). Here, the standard 
ML tools at the disposal of the engineer usu-
ally fail since, for the machine, modelling 
human behavior is extremely hard; never-
theless, it is needed to some extent, if one 
wants to detect the subject’s intent, that is, 
what the subject wants the machine to do. 
Human behavior is non-stationary, com-
plex, culture- and goal-directed, almost 
unpredictable in the medium and long run; 
plus, usable examples from humans can be 
excruciatingly hard to obtain. all these as-
pects make the problem of human-machine 
interaction extremely hard for “realist” ML.
« 30 » so, what is needed in human-
machine interaction is a way to constantly 
“monitor” the desires of the subject, con-
tinually gather new examples and learn 
from her, engage her in a dialog with the 
4 | What statistical analysis can gain by 
adopting the RC perspective – how the “maths” 
can be used differently – is a very interesting re-
search agenda for the future; notice that nowadays 
the ML community “teaches a culture or schemata 
to the system” by choosing an ML algorithm spe-
cific to each different task the ML system needs 
to pursue.
expectations of the ML system – the perfect 
problem for an RC-framed iML system. in 
addition, in this field we have the almost 
obvious chance to exploit the judgment of 
the human as the feedback system/external 
agent (“the world talks back to the know-
ing machine”) mentioned in §§21f, to trig-
ger the perturbation and the model updates 
(Castellini 2016). The match with the RC 
concepts of assimilation, scheme theory, ac-
commodation, and equilibration is hereby 
clear: the ML system must have the capabil-
ity to be perturbed and to re-equilibrate the 
perturbation produced by the interaction 
with the world into its model of the world/
of human intent.
« 31 » We claim that RC-framed iML 
could be a more useful/interesting/sophisti-
cated choice than traditional ML and iML, 
and especially so whenever dealing with 
“feedback” in human-machine interaction.
« 32 » We have arrived at this idea in a 
somehow non-linear way. namely, the need 
for iML in human-machine interaction 
stems from the frustration of the second 
author of this article, an engineer who has 
been trying for 10 years to build smart pros-
thetic arm/hand control systems (upper-
limb myocontrol), which is a typical case of 
human-machine interaction. unhappy with 
ML-based myocontrol, he recently tried 
to evolve ML pursuing “a more interactive 
pathway” (Castellini 2016); while doing so, 
he faced a new set of problems which called 
for appropriate conceptual tools. The en-
counter with the third author of this article, 
a trained RC psychologist dealing with de-
cision-making models and decision-support 
systems in the subfield of investing, resulted 
in the usage of the concepts of knowledge, 
learning, communication, and feedback as 
traditionally developed within RC.
« 33 » upper-limb myocontrol (Fougn-
er et al. 2012) consists of using muscle ac-
tivation of the remaining upper limb of an 
amputated human subject to detect her in-
tention to move and accordingly control a 
prosthetic arm/hand to perform the desired 
action quickly, precisely, safely and reli-
ably – in this case ML is used to transform 
such activity (input data) into control com-
mands (target values). Most such systems 
are, currently, realist ML systems: a great 
deal of arm/hand/muscle configurations are 
gathered initially, a model is built, then its 
accuracy is tested while the amputated sub-
ject tries to control the prosthesis. The few 
exceptions (e.g., Gijsberts et al. 2014; Hahne, 
Markovic & Farina 2017; Mathewson & Pi-
larski 2017) are proving to work in practice. 
The only commercial solution enforcing 
ML, namely the Complete Control system 
by Coapt LLC, employs iML in the form of 
the option to “re-calibrate” the prosthetic 
control system whenever the user so wishes 
(Lock et al. 2011; simon, Lock & stubble-
field 2012; also, personal communication by 
Blair Lock, CEo of Coapt LLC, 2017).
« 34 » The traditional realist approach 
to myocontrol still fails after 40 years of 
research (Jiang et al. 2012; Farina, Jiang & 
Rehbaum 2014), the main problem being 
unreliability: the inability to guarantee that 
an arm prosthesis will do exactly what the 
subject wants, for exactly the length of time 
she wants. unreliability can be catastrophic 
(e.g., prosthetic hand unwantedly releasing 
the steering wheel while driving) or in the 
best case “just” frustrating, humiliating and 
socially unacceptable. as a consequence of 
this impasse, the acceptance of self-powered 
prostheses by upper-limb amputees is very 
limited, with rejection rates of up to 75%. 
simply put, state-of-the-art upper-limb 
prostheses do not work well enough to jus-
tify the cost and effort required to use them 
(Micera, Carpaneto & Raspopovic 2010; 
Peerdeman et al. 2011; Castellini et al. 2014).
« 35 » our goal is to show that RC-
framed iML could change the situation. 
unreliability arises from the innumerable 
variety of different situations in which a 
prosthesis must perform a certain action. 
For instance, maintaining a firm grasp on 
a rail must be ensured notwithstanding ex-
ternal force disturbances, changes in applied 
muscle activation, the posture of the arm, 
etc. since it is de facto impossible to build 
an example set, at the outset, containing ex-
amples of all these situations and all further 
possible ones, sooner or later realist ML-
based myocontrol will fail (Castellini 2016). 
a spectacular example of this is represented 
by the outcome of the aRM competition 
of the 2016 Cybathlon – see, e.g., Wolf sch-
weitzer, Michael Thali & david Egger (2018) 
for a detailed analysis of the current pitfalls 
and practical requirements of myocontrol.
« 36 » as opposed to that, existing iML-
based myocontrol counters this problem ex-
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actly thanks to on-demand model updating: 
whenever a new situation arises in which it 
fails, the subject “teaches” the system how 
to cope with it; the system, in turn, read-
ily adapts to the new knowledge (Castellini 
2016). unsurprisingly, iML-based myocon-
trol already is reported by, at least, arjan 
Gijsberts et al. (2014) and ilaria strazzulla et 
al. (2017), where, however, very little is said 
about the most proficient/natural way to de-
sign and enforce the interaction between the 
system and the user. another crucial aspect 
or side-product of iML, namely co-adapta-
tion, is only now being explored (Hahne, 
Markovic & Farina 2017), yet there is no 
indication of what theoretical framework 
could/would optimally guide the design of 
the interaction interface.
« 37 » is our claim that RC-framed iML 
is superior when dealing with “feedback” in 
human-machine interaction (§31) justified, 
specifically as far as upper-limb myocontrol 
(§35) is concerned? does RC-framed iML 
enforce better myocontrol than realist ML? 
This is a subset of our RC research agenda: 
“Can a knowing subject (here an ML system) 
that adopts a non-realist theory of knowledge 
do better than a realist one?” to shed some 
light on this question we have compared an 
RC-framed iML-based myocontrol system 
with a traditional ML-based myocontrol 
system in a pilot experiment involving hu-
man subjects.
experiment
overview
« 38 » ideally, two upper-limb myocon-
trol systems, an RC-framed and interac-
tive one and a non-interactive (RC versus 
realist) one would be compared during 
completely unrestricted daily-living us-
age by two distinct groups of amputated 
subjects. Here we adopted some simplifi-
cations. Firstly, we engaged fifteen intact 
human subjects only; secondly, we used 
two 3d hand models displayed on a com-
puter screen instead of tangible prosthetic 
devices.
« 39 » The experiment as a whole con-
sisted of three sub-experiments, each of 
which will be from now on referred to as 
Experiment 0, 1 and 2, respectively. namely, 
we compared (Experiment 0) a traditional, 
non-interactive, realist upper-limb myo-
control ML system, with (Experiment  1) 
a “part-time” RC-framed interactive ML 
system, a “weakly RC” system, and (Experi-
ment 2) a “full-time” RC-framed interactive 
ML system, a “fully-fledged” RC system.
ml method
« 40 » Following the motto “keep it 
as simple as possible, but not simpler than 
that,” attributed to albert Einstein, all three 
ML systems employed in the experiment are 
based upon least-squares regression in the 
regularised form called Ridge Regression, fil-
tered through a non-linear mapping called 
Random Fourier Features (RR-RFF). RR-
RFF exists both in “batch” form (i.e., non-
incremental and therefore non-interactive) 
and in incremental form (iRR-RFF – for the 
mathematical details see Castellini 2016). 
notice that iRR-RFF is guaranteed to yield 
the same optimal model as RR-RFF, when-
ever the same example sets are used with ei-
ther method. This enables a fair comparison 
between an ML and an RC-framed iML sys-
tem even from an exquisitely mathematical 
point of view.
participants
« 41 » Fifteen intact human subjects 
(5 females and 10 males, age 19–54 years) 
participated in the experiment. Before the 
experiment took place, it was clearly ex-
plained to each participant, both orally and 
in writing, that no health risk was involved. 
Each participant signed an informed con-
sent form. The experiment was previously 
approved by the internal committee for data 
protection of the institution where the ex-
periments took place, and it followed the 
guidelines of the World Medical association 
declaration of Helsinki. The participants 
were randomly assigned to one experiment 
only, so that five participants took part in 
each experiment.
experimental setup
« 42 » The experimental setup was com-
mon to all three experiments, and consisted 
of
  a Myo bracelet by Thalmic Labs,
  two 3d hand models displayed on a 
computer screen, and
  a simple voice reproduction/speech re-
cognition system.
« 43 » The Myo bracelet (https://www.
thalmic.com) consists of eight uniformly 
spaced sensors, able to detect the electro-
myographic signal generated by the muscle 
activity of the subject’s forearm.
« 44 » The 3d hand models realisti-
cally mimic the motions of a human wrist 
and hand. one of the models is white while 
the other is rendered in skin-like texture; 
the former (from now on referred to as the 
stimulus) is used to provide visual stimuli to 
the participants, i.e., it is controlled by the 
software itself; whereas the latter (from now 
on referred to as the prosthesis) simulates 
the prosthesis – given the current model, it 
enforces the predicted motions of the hand 
and wrist, as evaluated from the data pro-
vided by the bracelet.
« 45 » The speech recognition and 
synthesis system is the one embedded in 
Microsoft.nEt Framework 4.5, able to dis-
tinguish a small set of words (in this case, 
“good”/“bad”) pronounced by the subjects, 
and to utter predefined voice messages, 
which we configured with a clearly synthetic 
female voice. all sentences were uttered in 
the first person and address the participant 
in the second person (e.g., “you are now go-
ing to teach me how i should move”).
experimental protocol
« 46 » Each participant sat comfortably 
in front of the computer screen, and the 
bracelet was wrapped around her forearm. 
she was instructed to hold the forearm ver-
tically, leaning the elbow on the table.
« 47 » a voice message was played. The 
prosthesis “spoke,” explaining to the sub-
ject that the “training session” (the experi-
ment) was about teaching it – a new kind 
of hand/wrist prosthesis able to learn – how 
to properly perform the movements in-
tended by the participant, and that to this 
aim, a 3d hand model would eventually ap-
pear on the screen, representing itself (the 
prosthesis). The prosthesis clearly stated 
that the participant would not be judged 
on her performance, but rather that she was 
going to “show” the prosthesis how each 
single movement was to be performed, by 
simply doing it; rather, the prosthesis was 
to be judged by the participant on its learn-
ing ability. Particular care was taken by the 
prosthesis in asking the participant to be 
patient and not to get disappointed if it did 
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not correctly execute the required task. af-
ter all, concluded the prosthesis, its learning 
ability was “only in its infancy.”
« 48 » We chose this way to commu-
nicate to the subject what to do in the ex-
periment, to try and build a psychological 
context of interaction rules and reciprocal 
roles, potentially inducing in the subject the 
construction of positive “emotions” (Harré 
1986) toward the “learning” prosthesis. 
More generally, while designing the experi-
mental protocol, we also tried to take into 
account the main criticisms raised by post-
modern social psychology with regard to 
the way human subjects are treated in most 
experimental psychology (and in general 
in experiments involving human subjects), 
i.e., that experimenters neglect to offer to 
(co-construct with) the subject a semiotic 
definition of the experimental situation 
meaningful to her, and take into account 
the meaning of the experimental setting 
from their own perspective only (Gergen 
1978a, 1978b, 1985; Gergen & Gergen 1985; 
Harré 1979; Harré, smith & van Langen-
hove 1995). Figure 1 shows a schematic rep-
resentation of the experimental setup.
experiment 0
« 49 » Experiment 0 (the realist ma-
chine learning system) consisted of two 
phases that we will call model building 
(MB) and model testing (Mt).
« 50 » at the beginning of MB, the 
stimulus was shown on the screen; the 
prosthesis then explained that “the white 
hand on the screen” (the stimulus) would 
now perform a series of hand and wrist 
movements (tasks), and that the partici-
pant should simply mimic what the stimu-
lus was doing with her hand and wrist, as 
accurately as possible, in order to give the 
prosthesis a chance to “try and understand” 
what each movement looked like when 
seen through the signals it received from 
the bracelet.
« 51 » soon afterwards, the stimulus 
was shown on the screen. a randomised 
sequence of 30 tasks (6 actions, each action 
repeated 5 times), was played by the stimu-
lus. The actions were: no-action; wrist flex-
ion; wrist extension; wrist pronation; wrist 
supination; and hand closing. no voice in-
teraction was provided during this phase. 
MB would end at the end of this sequence.
« 52 » in this experiment, the ML sys-
tem had, so to speak, the expectation that 
all signals it would receive would be “good” 
signals. The system would experience no per-
turbation in the building of its inner vision of 
the “world.” in other words, each signal was 
“fitting” with previous signals, and the sys-
tem was forced to accept all signals as good 
ones, upon which to build its own “reality” 
(model).
« 53 » in practice, the model was evalu-
ated in the interval between MB and Mt, 
using the data collected during MB. The 
evaluation took a few seconds, so that no 
apparent interruption would be felt by the 
participant.
« 54 » at the beginning of Mt, the fore-
arm of the participant would be hidden 
from view using an opaque cardboard par-
tition (this is our rough approximation for 
the subject “wearing” the prosthesis); then 
the prosthesis would appear on the screen, 
beside the stimulus. it would then explain 
that now the stimulus would show a further 
series of tasks, similar to those that had ap-
peared during MB, that the participant must 
reproduce those actions, and that the pros-
thesis would try to understand the signals 
it received from the bracelet and mimic the 
action performed by the participant as best 
it could.
« 55 » it also explained that, after each 
task had been performed, the prosthesis 
would verbally ask that the participant eval-
uate its performance; the participant would 
then be asked to say “good” or “bad” accord-
ing to her own judgment.
« 56 » soon afterwards, a further, ran-
domised sequence of 90 tasks (the same 6 
actions as during MB, but in this case each 
action was repeated 15 times) was played 
by the stimulus. after each task, the judg-
ment would happen: the prosthesis would 
ask how it had performed, and the partici-
pant would answer “good” or “bad.” Figure 2 
shows a bird’s eye view of the experimental 
setup while a subject was engaged in Experi-
ment 0, Mt.
experiment 1
« 57 » Experiment 1 (the “part-time” 
interactive machine learning system) con-
sisted of two phases like Experiment 0. in 
this case, however, the hand of the partici-
pant was hidden behind the cardboard par-
tition already during MB, and the prosthe-
sis would be immediately visualised beside 
the stimulus (the participants “wore” the 
prosthesis from the beginning). The same 
randomised sequence of tasks as in Experi-
ment 0 was played by the stimulus; but in 
this case, after each task, the participant 
would be asked by the prosthesis to evaluate 
its own performance, just like during Mt of 
Experiment 0.
« 58 » if the participant answered 
“good,” the data gathered during the task 
was directly added to the machine-learning 
Stimulus
Protocol
ML
EMG
Prosthesis
Speech
synthesis
Speech
recognition
Figure 1 • A schematic depiction of the experimental setup. Subjects interact with the protocol 
controller via speech recognition, speech synthesis, and by looking at a PC screen on which the 
stimulus is displayed. The ML method “converts” EMG signals into live configurations of the 
prosthesis to be shown as well to the subject; while the protocol controller establishes what 
to display and utter, and when to open/close the flow of information between the subject and 
the ML method. The protocol controller, together with the ML method, constitute a flexible 
framework for all three experiments, allowing for different levels of interactivity.
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model in order to reinforce the positive re-
sult. if the participant answered “bad,” she 
was vocally instructed to perform the task 
once again, and the data collected during 
this new instance of the action would be 
added to the model in order to correct for 
the previous negative performance. in both 
cases, the model would be immediately 
re-evaluated in order to reflect the new ac-
quired data without delay. This way, assimi-
lation and accommodation directly enter 
the picture of iML: via the external/human 
feedback.
« 59 » in this case, we can say, the ML 
system had the expectation that all signals 
it would receive would be “good” ones, but 
at the same time it would indeed experience 
some perturbation (the negative human 
feedback), so it was forced to not assimi-
late all signals, but rather to accommodate 
some specific ones, changing its recogni-
tion pattern and building a different scheme 
(model).
« 60 » Mt in Experiment 1 was identi-
cal to Mt of Experiment 0.
« 61 » substantially, Experiment 1 con-
sisted of a partially interactive version of 
Experiment 0: during MB, the participant 
would offer the prosthesis some confirma-
tion and some perturbation, therefore help-
ing the prosthesis to better learn the patterns 
corresponding to the required actions, so 
that in the end the model would reflect the 
corrections.
« 62 » notice that the amount of data 
used to build the model in Experiment 1 
was exactly the same as in Experiment 0 (30 
tasks) – what changed was the added inter-
action with the participant, and consequent-
ly, the possibility for the system to have con-
firmation or perturbation of its inner world 
formed with the data gathered during MB.
experiment 2
« 63 » Experiment 2 consisted of one 
phase only, identical to MB of Experiment 
1, except that the stimulus would play a ran-
domised sequence of 120 tasks (the same 
6 actions as in the previous experiments, 
but in this case each action was repeated 
20 times). as in Experiment 1, the model 
would be re-evaluated after each task (again, 
according to the “good”/“bad” judgement 
of the participant); but for each task, data 
gathered during the past five repetitions only 
of this action were used to build the model. 
This ensured that the amount of data used 
to build the model was, again, the same as in 
the previous experiments (30 tasks).
« 64 » Experiment 2 consisted therefore 
of a “continual learning/feedback” version of 
Experiment 1, enforcing vocal interaction 
between the participant and the system at 
all times.
« 65 » according to the RC learning 
theory, our ML system did have a scheme 
of the world: it had indeed the expectation 
that all signals received would be “good” 
ones, but constantly experienced (internal) 
confirmation and perturbation, thus being 
forced to modify its own model of the world. 
The system designed for Experiment 2 is our 
main conceptual (and practical) attempt at 
arriving at iML via the RC theory of knowl-
edge and learning, prevalently stressing the 
RC idea of viability relating to “utilitarian-
ism” (see above, §17).
« 66 » Figure  3 graphically represents 
the three experiments, while Figure 4 shows 
flow-charts of each experiment.
Figure 2 • The experimental setup while a subject performs Experiment 0, MT. The stimulus (white 
hand) and the “prosthesis” (skin-textured hand) are displayed on the screen; the subject’s right 
arm (wearing the Myo bracelet) and hand are shielded from view using a cardboard partition.
MT
MT
MB
6x5 tasks
6x20 tasks
6x15 tasks
6x5 tasks
No interaction Interaction Model evaluation
6x15 tasks
Exp0
Exp1
Exp2
MB
(single phase)
Figure 3 • A graphical representation of the three experiments. Phase MB (Model Building) of 
Experiment 1 and the entire Experiment 2 are interactive; model generation happens between 
phases MB and MT (Model Testing) in Experiment 0, during phase MB in Experiment 1 and dur-
ing the entire experiment in Experiment 2.
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evaluation measures
« 67 » We wanted to measure which of 
the three machine learning systems (realist, 
“part-time” RC-framed interactive and “full-
time” RC-framed interactive) could produce 
a model capable of better understanding the 
patterns produced by the subject, thereby 
properly performing (as a prosthesis) the 
actions that the subject wanted to do. so, we 
adopted a measure that was objective for the 
experimenter and the research community 
of upper-limb myocontrol: the normalised 
root-mean-squared error (nRMsE) between 
the position of the stimulus and that of the 
“prosthesis” during each task – essentially, 
the discrepancy between the desired posi-
tion and what the prosthesis manages to 
do. to evaluate the nRMsE, for each task 
we considered the last second in which the 
stimulus was performing the required ac-
tion, in order to neglect as far as possible 
any transition effect (i.e., the time the sub-
jects needed to become aware of what was 
asked of them, and to move their own hand 
and wrist to the required position).
« 68 » We also wanted to measure 
which of the three machine learning sys-
tems was perceived as the best one by the 
subjects, so we also adopted a measure that 
was objective for the subject: the number 
of poor/good judgements expressed by the 
subject during the experiment.
« 69 » These two measures described 
in the two preceding paragraphs make our 
experimental evaluation akin to the target 
achievement Control test (taC test, see, 
e.g., simon et al. 2011), an assessment test 
well-known in the myocontrol commu-
nity; the only remarkable difference is that 
whether a task is successful or not is left to 
the participant’s judgment.
« 70 » Lastly, we wanted to evaluate the 
quality of the subject-prosthesis relationship 
from both the subject’s and the machine’s 
point of view – we were interested not only 
in measuring the performance, but also in 
checking the reciprocal adaptation. so, first 
of all we estimated how the signals of each 
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Figure 4 • Flow-charts of the three experiments (from left to right: Experiment 0, 1 and 2). Notice that the single phase in Experiment 2 is identical 
to MB in Experiment 1. Also notice that model evaluation happens only once during Experiment 0, whereas it happens within an interaction loop 
in Experiments 1 and 2.
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subject changed during the experiments; this 
was done by evaluating, at each task, Roland 
Fisher’s cluster separateness index (Fisher 
1936) for the signal clusters corresponding 
to the past 30 tasks (one cluster per action, 
resulting in six clusters). Fisher’s index in-
creases the more the clusters are separated, 
compact and distinct from each other; it rep-
resents therefore a measure of improvement 
in the “quality” of the signals produced by a 
subject.
« 71 » Moreover, after the experiment, 
we conducted a semi-structured interview 
with each subject, focused on
  the quality of the subject-machine learn-
ing system interaction,
  the subject’s judgment of the system’s 
learning capacity, and
  the fatigue experienced by the subject 
while teaching the system.
We conducted a qualitative thematic analysis 
on the semi-structured interview transcripts, 
through the conventional process of familia-
risation with data, generating initial codes, 
searching for themes among codes, review-
ing themes, defining and naming themes, 
and producing the final report.
experimental results and analysis
« 72 » in a first round of evaluation, it 
was determined that subject #13 in Experi-
ment 0 performed exceptionally badly (ex-
tremely high nRMsE) while subject #11 in 
Experiment 1 performed exceptionally well 
(extremely low nRMsE); data from these 
two subjects were removed from the analy-
sis as they were considered outliers. to keep 
the data sets balanced, we also removed one 
subject’s data at random (namely subject 
#7) from Experiment 2. so, the analysis was 
based upon data from 4 subjects per experi-
ment.
« 73 » Furthermore, the analysis was 
conducted on the last 90 tasks only, in order, 
again, to maintain a balanced dataset, and 
to avoid considering the inevitable acquain-
tance effect that each subject went through 
in the beginning of each experiment (phases 
MB of Experiments 0 and 1 and first 30 tasks 
of Experiment 2).
global statistics
« 74 » Figure 5 shows the global statistics 
of the experiment. The average nRMsE was 
11.61% (sd = 9.23%), 12.81% (sd = 11.39%) 
and 8.87% (sd = 9.01%), respectively, for 
Experiment 0, 1 and 2 (left panel, no statisti-
cally significant difference was found using 
a repeated-measures one-way anova test 
– F(2, 9) = 3.96, p = 0.058). in order to check 
whether nRMsE was correlated with the 
good/bad judgment, we also verified that the 
nRMsE is on average 7.9% (sd = 6.5%) and 
16.76% (sd = 12.48%) in turn, if grouped ac-
cording to the good/bad judgement (right 
panel, Welch’s t-test yields t(510.41) = 13.06, 
p < 10–4). Moreover, the number of good/bad 
judgments was 230/130 201/159 and 259/101 
in turn for Experiment 0, 1 and 2, with a 
statistically significant difference (the Chi-
squared significance test yields χ2(2) = 20.15, 
p < 10–4).
« 75 » From these results we can say that
  Experiment 2 resulted in an overall 
slightly better error rate than Experi-
ments 0 and 1, although the high stan-
dard deviations reduce the statistical 
significance of these results;
  Experiment  2 elicited more “good” 
judgments than Experiment 0, which in 
turn elicited more than Experiment  1; 
and
  “good” subjective judgments are posi-
tively correlated with lower nRMsE.
all in all, nRMsE values are in line with 
previous literature obtained from analogous 
experiments (Gijsberts et al. 2014; Ravindra 
& Castellini 2014; Connan et al. 2016).
evolution in time
« 76 » Figures 6 and 7 go into a little 
more detail, showing the nRMsE and num-
ber of good/bad responses for each experi-
ment, subject and task, along time. From 
these further graphs, we conclude that
  Experiments 0 and 1 produced high 
values of the nRMsE roughly scattered 
in Figure 6 all along the course of time 
(yellowish cells appearing all along the 
course of the tasks) whereas in Experi-
ment 2 the error seems to settle to lower 
values in the second half;
  subjects seemed to be much happier 
(prevalence of “good” judgments) in 
Experiment 2, especially subjects #3 
and #8, than in the other experiments 
– particularly, subject #4 almost consis-
tently judged the performance as “bad.”
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Figure 5 • Left: nRMSE grouped per experiment. Right: nRMSE grouped according to the subjective good/bad judgment. Median values (thick 
black lines), 25%/75% percentiles (“hinges”), extreme values (larger/smaller than 1.5 times the inter-quartile range) from the hinge (whiskers), and 
outliers (single dots).
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Figure 8 • Mean nRMSE and its standard deviation, averaged across subjects, for each experiment. Top to bottom: Experiment 0, 1 and 2.
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Figure 10 • Change in the signal clusters as two subjects (#4, upper panels and #6, lower panels) progress from task 1 (left column) to task 90 
(right column) of Experiment 0. Dimensionality reduction obtained using Principal Component Analysis; the first two principal components re-
tain 90.73% of the signal variance for subject #4 and 95.40% for subject #6. See also “Additional material.”
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« 77 » Figure 8 shows the temporal evo-
lution of the nRMsE, averaged across all sub-
jects (mean values and standard deviations), 
which confirms (consider §76 again) that not 
only the mean values, but also the standard 
deviations of the nRMsE remain lower in 
Experiment 2 than in the other two Experi-
ments.
« 78 » Figure  9 shows Fisher’s index 
along time, for all tasks, subjects and experi-
ments. Experiments 0 and 2 elicited, on av-
erage, an increase in the separateness of the 
signal clusters.
« 79 » Lastly, Figure  10 shows 2d-re-
duced signal clusters obtained from two sub-
jects, #4 and #6, at tasks 1 and 90 of Mt in 
Experiment 0. (These two subjects are cho-
sen as an exemplary good and an exemplary 
bad subject.) The higher compactness and 
separateness of the clusters at task 90 (that 
is, at the end of the Experiment) is apparent, 
especially for subject #4. subject #6 shows 
poorer cluster separateness, though – five ac-
tions appear “lumped” together.
semi-structured interviews
« 80 » The semi-structured interviews 
we conducted allow us to conclude, in the 
first place, that all subjects involved in Ex-
periment 2 complained about muscle fatigue 
towards the end, whereas only one subject 
not involved in Experiment 2 did. This is due 
to the increased number of tasks performed, 
in turn due to the possibility of judging “bad” 
and potentially having to repeat the previ-
ous action at all times. The finding that the 
nRMsE obtained in Experiment 2 seems 
not to particularly increase towards the end 
(Figure 6 and 8, bottom panel), and that its 
standard deviation remains low (Figure  8, 
bottom panel), is all the more remarkable.
« 81 » secondly, no pattern is apparent 
in the judgments along time (Figure 7); we 
found that each subject approached the Ex-
periments with seemingly different hopes 
and expectations. For example, subjects #4 
and #12 mostly judged “bad” and both re-
ported posture/muscle discomfort; subjects 
#2 and #5 judged “bad” quite often, the for-
mer reporting difficulty in rating the move-
ments only as good or bad and the latter 
reporting frustration due to the “continual 
oscillation” of the prosthesis; lastly, subjects 
#3, #6 and #8 mostly judged “good,” and all 
reported being “positively impressed” by the 
progress obtained by the prosthesis in the 
beginning.
« 82 » it is interesting to note that, upon 
a closer look at Fisher’s index for each subject 
(not displayed), subjects who mostly judged 
“good” consistently ended up with higher 
Fisher’s index and vice versa.
general remarks
« 83 » The experimental results shown 
above let us make a few claims. Given the 
low number of subjects involved, match-
ing the semi-structured interviews with the 
experimental results allowed us to add a 
“layer” of meaning-for-the-subject of what 
happened during the experiment, offering us 
clues on how to read the data gathered in the 
experimental setting. something particularly 
useful in a pilot study with a small number of 
subjects, but also useful in general in experi-
ments involving human beings.
« 84 » The subjective measure of satis-
faction, that is the good/bad judgments, is 
by and large in agreement with the objec-
tive one for the experimenter (the nRMsE), 
as is apparent from Figure 5, right panel: on 
average, whenever the subjects saw that the 
prosthesis was “doing the right thing,” they 
judged “good” and vice versa. This shows 
that the voice and visual interaction was well 
designed. as opposed to that, the experiment 
number (0, 1 or 2) turns out to significantly 
skew the number of good/bad judgments 
(for instance, Experiment 2 elicited signifi-
cantly more “good” than “bad” judgments) 
but not the nRMsE: although the error is 
on average lower for Experiment 2 than for 
0 and 1, and lower for 0 than for 1, it is not 
significantly so. These two remarks seem to 
somehow collide, but it is not yet clear to us 
in what sense.
« 85 » There is a significant evolution in 
time of the subjects’ signals (Figures 9 and 
10 – see also “additional material”) during 
Experiments 0 and 2. We speculate that the 
increase in Fisher’s index during Experiment 
2 could be due to the concurrent evolution 
of the subjects and the machines. notice, 
however, that during Experiment 0 the ML 
model was not adapting at all during the 
Mt phase, although some of the subjects 
involved in Experiment 0 reported that they 
felt that “the machine was learning.”
« 86 » all in all, the “partially inter-
active” experiment, that is Experiment 1, 
seemed to produce slightly worse results 
than the non-interactive one; whereas the 
“fully interactive” one, Experiment 2, pro-
duced slightly better objective results than 
both the other experiments, and definitely 
better subjective results – higher satisfaction 
expressed by the subject.
« 87 » Muscle fatigue seems to have 
played a significant role in the experiment, 
which we had not foreseen. unfortunately, 
this was mostly the case in Experiment 2 
since interaction means more tasks to per-
form by the subject. still, the error in Experi-
ment 2 is more “uniform” (lower mean, lower 
standard deviation) than in the other cases. 
a further refinement of the experimental 
design will need to take into account fatigue 
as an unavoidable problem; but we should at 
the same time remember that fatigue is one 
of the factors that make myocontrol a non-
stationary modelling problem, that is to say, 
one of the problems that iML should be bet-
ter at tackling, in principle.
conclusion
« 88 » one must admit that, if taken 
from the point of view of the engineer, the re-
sults of the experimental analysis are some-
what disappointing – there is no definite, 
statistically significant objective improve-
ment (although there is some) when enforc-
ing more interactivity, also conceptualised 
in line with RC’s learning theory. still, the 
subjects involved in the experiments gener-
ally reported a smoother interaction with the 
ML system in the case of Experiment 2.
« 89 » Therefore, the missing suggestion 
that the RC approach gives to the ML practi-
tioner – that of using RC-framed iML – goes 
farther toward creating a better experience 
for the user of an upper-limb prosthesis. The 
application of RC to this problem gives us 
useful insight into how to design the interac-
tive prosthesis of the future; points us toward 
more ecological experiments, more deeply 
embedded in daily life, aiming at enforcing 
interactivity with the subject at all times, just 
like it happens with modern gadgets such as, 
e.g., smartphones. Reciprocal adaptation in-
spired by RC’s learning theory seems to defi-
nitely be a factor to be exploited in this field.
« 90 » The main contribution of this 
work is to reframe iML within radical con-
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Human-machine i terface  William cra lius
structivism. although still far from fully 
tackling the theoretical implications of this 
idea, in this article we try to show what the 
potentialities of such a link are. Especially, 
we expect the marriage between RC and ML 
to produce, in the near future, a set of guide-
lines on how to design the ML “statistical 
engine” and the interaction that is at the core 
of interactive machine learning: how to re-
frame interaction and feedback according to 
RC’s learning theory. What should be asked 
of the human operator, how and when? How 
should the information so obtained be used? 
neither the engineers’ community, nor the 
world of functional assessment can, at this 
stage, thoroughly answer this question.
« 91 » Extensions to this research 
should definitely include at least the capabil-
ity, for an RC-framed ML system, to decide 
internally, autonomously whether a signal is 
not a good one. This means that the system 
must trigger by itself a perturbation when-
ever a signal does not fit its conceptualiza-
tion (model) of the world, thus enforcing 
the RC idea of viability related to conceptual 
coherence.
« 92 » all in all, this article has explored 
the application of radically constructivist 
“glasses” to a typical problem in human-
robot interaction, and specifically to upper-
limb myocontrol. More generally, we have 
tried to rework, in RC terms, some of the 
problems faced by ML and iML; we have 
speculated that the usage of RC-framed iML 
matches some of the ideas that, among oth-
ers, von Glasersfeld applied to human learn-
ing. our results suggest that RC-inspired 
interactivity has the potential to improve 
human-robot interaction, especially from 
the point of view of the humans.
additional material
The dynamic 3d evolution of the clus-
ters from task 1 to 90 can be seen in two 
short movie clips at http://constructivist.
info/data/13/2/s4e0.gif and http://construc-
tivist.info/data/13/2/s6e0.gif.
acknowledgements
This work was partially supported by 
the German Research Foundation’s project 
Tact_hand: Improving control of prosthetic 
hands using tactile sensors and realistic 
machine learning (dFG sachbeihilfe Ca-
1389/1, see http://gepris.dfg.de/gepris/pro-
jekt/272314643).
Received: 31 august 2017 
accepted: 26 January 2018
marKus noWaK
received an MSc degree (Dipl.-Ing.) in mechanical engineering from the Technical University 
of Munich, Germany. In his master’s course of study he focused on medical engineering and 
numerical mechanics. His master’s thesis was carried out in cooperation with the Institute 
of Robotics and Mechatronics of the German Aerospace Center, Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany. 
After his masters he continued as a research fellow at the Robotics and Mechatronics Center 
with a focus on human–machine interfaces for controlling upper-limb prosthetics.
{
claudio castellini
received a Laurea in Biomedical Engineering in 1998 from the University of Genova, Italy, 
and a PhD in Artificial Intelligence in 2005 from the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. Since 
2009 he has been a researcher at the Institute of Robotics and Mechatronics of the German 
Aerospace Center, Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany, concentrating on human-machine interfaces 
for the disabled and assistive robotics. He is currently (co-)author of about 85 papers 
that have appeared in international journals, books and peer-reviewed conferences.
{
carlo massironi
received a Laurea in Clinical Psychology in 1996 from the University of Padua, Italy and a 
Specializzazione in Cognitive-Interactive Psychotherapy (constructivist and interactionist models in 
psychotherapy and problem solving) in 2001 from the Istituto di Psicologia e Psicoterapia Interazionista 
Psicopraxis, Padua, Italy. Since 2003 he has been an associate researcher at the same institute, 
concentrating on decision making, investment decision making and investment decision support 
systems. Since 2001 he has worked as an asset manager. He is currently (co-)author of some 10 
papers that have appeared in international journals, books and peer-reviewed conferences.
{
263
Human-machine interface  William craelius
Radical Constructivism
               http://constructivist.info/13/2/250.nowak
a radical constructivist 
approach to the Human-
machine interface
William Craelius
Sichuan Bayi Rehabilitation Center, 
China, and Rutgers University, USA 
craelius/at/soe.rutgers.edu
> upshot • Thousands of projects aimed 
at improving the functionality of upper-
limb prostheses over the decades have 
failed to significantly advance the field 
of assistive robotics. Having been unfa-
miliar with radical constructivism (RC) so 
far, I want to see how its approach could 
contribute, particularly for amputees. 
Perhaps the most profound insight to 
be gained from RC is that the prosthesis 
is the machine to be taught by the user 
to serve her needs, not the other way 
around.
« 1 » Current myoelectric (hereafter 
“myoe”) control systems for upper-limb 
prostheses embody a small repertoire of 
utilitarian movements that can be executed 
individually upon user activation of specific 
muscles in the residual limb. The move-
ment repertoire is severely limited by inad-
equacy of the user’s interface with her pros-
thesis, i.e., the human–machine interface 
(HMi). Thus, while the mechanical hard-
ware of modern robotic hands can nearly 
or completely reproduce human dexterity, 
prosthetic users cannot, and new control 
paradigms are urgently needed. Currently 
available HMis are non-intuitive, and de-
mand much more mental attention than do 
natural movements. typically, prosthetic 
grasping is triggered by user volition for 
“wrist flexion” (despite the users having no 
functional wrist), that produces a particular 
muscle activation signal in the residuum. in 
some prostheses, several different similarly 
pre-programmed tasks may be activated, 
depending on the user’s ability to learn and 
produce a sequence of the correct muscle ac-
tivations in her residuum. The practical util-
ity of a prosthesis thus depends on the user’s 
ability to learn not only the right moves by 
her residuum, but also of her body poses, 
which are an important part of the motor 
control loop (Metzger et al. 2012). Function-
ality also depends upon the situation: rela-
tively good control can be achieved under 
relatively fixed, static conditions; however, 
in situations requiring careful calibration 
of overall body movements (e.g., carrying 
an egg), it falls short. in general, most ac-
tivities of daily living that involve manipu-
lation, and certainly any tasks that require 
dexterity, exceed the capabilities of available 
HMis. a common failure that cannot be 
fixed by the myoe controller is malfunction 
of the sensors themselves, commonly caused 
by sweating or dislodgement, which is not 
the fault of the ML. alternative sensors of 
muscle activity, which are less subject to fail-
ure, have been demonstrated (Castellini et 
al. 2014: 22), but are not yet widely adopted. 
Thus, for several reasons, including some 
that have nothing to do with the type of ML 
used, many users of upper-limb prostheses 
abandon theirs.
« 2 » Myoe controllers, in their most 
primitive (typical) configuration, direct pre-
programmed prosthetic actions upon re-
ceiving signals from specific muscles. Mus-
cular activities are statistical events that can 
be compared against an explicitly pre-pro-
grammed value, a paradigm that is consid-
ered to be a form of machine learning (ML) 
(§2). any muscle signal that exceeds a pre-
set amplitude threshold produces a binary 
“1” input to the prosthesis. in some cases, 
the user can serially trigger several different 
prosthetic motions from a pre-programmed 
repertoire, by executing particular sequenc-
es of discrete motions, each of which pro-
duces distinguishable muscle contractions. 
The potential movement repertoire is lim-
ited by the skill and patience of the user in 
producing strings of supra-threshold muscle 
contractions, and the abilities of the HMi 
(computer) to compare the input with the 
pre-programmed threshold. one advantage 
of the current myoe paradigm is binariza-
tion of muscle activations, which provides 
relatively noise-free, unambiguous examples 
to serve as ML inputs; this feature, however, 
is at the expense of information about move-
ment magnitude and force.
« 3 » RC theory requires any “viable” 
model of the world to be both utilitarian and 
“conceptually coherent” (Glasersfeld 2005), 
so we can ask whether the realist model is 
viable (§17) and otherwise conformable 
to RC principles. in terms of RC, the real-
ist model embodies utility, i.e., it produces 
at least one useful task fairly well: grasping. 
With regard to being conceptually coherent 
(§17), however, it fails, since there are now 
better solutions to the problem. Moreover, 
the RC idea of “learning as a constructive 
activity” requires continual learning by the 
prosthesis as it interacts with its user, repre-
senting a 180-degree shift from the current 
myoe control paradigm. The current myoe 
model, as described in the first two para-
graphs above, is based on a “‘realist” attitude, 
which assumes, according to §11, continual 
open peer commentaries
on markus nowak et al.’s “applying radical constructivism 
to machine learning”
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performance as programmed, requiring “no 
further changes.” if accurate, this attitude 
would represent the antithesis of RC prin-
ciples, however, it may be a bit exaggerated 
if taken too literally. The need for periodic 
myoe program adjustments is widely rec-
ognized and in practice, and changes are 
implemented where practical, regardless of 
what type of controller. in the traditional 
sense of the word, “viable,” however, we 
must acknowledge the practical viability of 
realist myoe control, because it serves many 
thousands of amputees.
« 4 » The RC framework, as elaborated 
by Markus nowak, Claudio Castellini and 
Carlo Massironi, introduces a radically new, 
and possibly improved, prosthetic control 
paradigm. The first and most obvious in-
sight from RC is that our present prosthetic 
model employs a strategy opposite to ma-
chine learning: instead of the prosthesis 
learning the proper responses to the user, 
it acts as the teacher, demanding the cor-
rect input from the user (who is the learner) 
for proper performance. a second insight 
is the potential pitfalls of a supposed realist 
attitude to statistics. Muscle activation sig-
nals are composed of Gaussian noise, gen-
erated by a large number of asynchronous 
motor units, which are variably active for 
each movement in a sequence. The applica-
tion of a statistical test to such signals, using 
fixed decision boundaries, is bound to lead 
to erroneous decisions, since two identical 
events, such as sequential movement com-
mands, can be statistically different in their 
muscular representations. Thirdly, the idea 
of incrementally updating the controller (in-
cremental ML) is integral to constructivism. 
This process, iML, was demonstrated in the 
pilot studies, consisting of constant moni-
toring and teaching of the prosthesis by the 
user (§65), and appears to be viable.
« 5 » it is useful to compare the current 
(realist) myoe model with a hypothetical 
RC-framed control model. Current myoe 
systems treat their input as an unequivocal 
signal, either to be detected or rejected, ac-
cording to its magnitude. RC insight recog-
nizes that inputs to an ML system exist only 
as “perceptual objects” that must be organ-
ized, without knowledge of their meaning. 
This is an important reminder that ML in-
puts represent a “reality” constructed by 
myoe sensors and thus constitute a noisy es-
timate of reality, which in our case consists 
of muscle activations. These perceptual ob-
jects must be matched against patterns con-
sisting of objects perceived by an imperfect 
system. This framework compensates for 
mistakes and mis-interpretations, by incor-
porating explicit procedures for correcting 
them. This ongoing positive feedback tends 
to promote positive emotions between user 
and her assistive robot.
« 6 » it is also useful to evaluate the pi-
lot study of incorporating RC principles into 
prosthetic control (§38 ff). The experiments 
were elegantly designed and executed, but 
the results rather disappointing (§88). Here, 
i critique the experimental design from my 
interpretation of RC principles.
« 7 » Firstly, training the prosthesis 
(machine) was done by subjects performing 
general movements and static positioning 
of joints related to their hands. While the 
prosthesis may more easily execute these 
movements, they do not fit well within the 
RC framework. The protocol involved no 
purpose, and lacked motivation. Humans 
like to perform tasks, especially those that 
are interesting, challenging, and have utility 
(Gorsic et al. 2017). Examples of this phe-
nomenon can be seen in previous studies 
wherein motor-disabled persons and am-
putees taught their virtual prosthesis to play 
and win standard games, such as pegboard 
(Kuttuva et al. 2005; Yungher & Craelius 
2012).
« 8 » a second critique is testing non-
disabled subjects on the use of an assistive 
robot. From an RC perspective, this seems 
conceptually incoherent. Persons with motor 
disabilities may be better teachers of assis-
tive robots than able-bodied persons, as sug-
gested by the two studies cited above. in a 
study of 12 persons with arm paresis due to 
brain injury playing a virtual pegboard game 
wearing a sensor sleeve on the affected arm, 
a significant improvement in speed of 15% 
was achieved after 30 trials with their virtual 
assistive robot; controls, in contrast, showed 
negligible improvement with their prosthe-
sis (Yungher & Craelius 2012). Qualitatively 
similar results were found in a smaller study 
comparing virtual prosthetic teaching by 
controls with that of persons having upper-
limb amputation (Kuttuva et al. 2005).
« 9 » a final critique relates to the ana-
tomical differences between the residuum 
and the intact limb. Muscles and tendons 
in the residuum are radically rearranged, 
and any natural synergies among them are 
disrupted. additionally, the typical conical 
shape of the residuum may be a better sub-
strate for sensor sleeves, which can readily 
accommodate 32 sensors as opposed to 8 
sensors typically applied to sound limbs.
« 10 » since the experiment with sub-
jects (§55) incorporated their vocal feed-
back to the prosthesis via speech recogni-
tion (sR), it is interesting to compare that 
technology, perhaps the oldest and most 
common ML system, with the current myoe 
ML system. There are four ways in which the 
systems differ radically from each other:
  myoe systems are necessarily custom-
tailored to individual users, whereas sR 
systems are designed to be universal,
  myoe systems are trained with relatively 
few examples, whereas sR systems are 
trained by as many examples as possible,
  sR is inherently interactive, whereas 
current myoe systems are not, and
  sR employs statistical predictive meth-
ods, unlike myoe, which does this mini-
mally.
« 11 » at the same time, myoe and sR 
systems share a major commonality, since 
both can be considered recursive translators. 
an sR translator interacts with a human who 
verbalizes an idea as words in one language, 
interprets those and translates the idea into 
words in another language. The myoe con-
troller interacts with a human who expresses 
a desired movement by muscle activations, 
and interprets those and translates the de-
sired movement as a robotic movement. it 
is noteworthy that speech recognition was 
not too long ago ridiculed as “crack-pot” 
by some, whose anecdote referred to the 
case when a computer program translated 
the phrase, “out of mind, out of sight” into 
Chinese and back to English, and it replied, 
“blind idiot.” We see analogous sorts of 
anomalies occurring in myoe control, when 
the prosthesis “goes off the rails,” but given 
progress along the right directions, as exem-
plified in this pilot study, assistive robotics 
technology may now be at a developmental 
stage resembling that of sR several years 
ago. When prosthetic controllers achieve the 
same accuracy as speech recognizers, ampu-
tees will then be able to enjoy a high degree 
of dexterity.
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> upshot • Machine learning (ML) has 
been applied in many forms and under 
many names over the years to the prob-
lem of mapping arrays of surface elec-
tromyogram (EMG) signals measured on 
the arm of a person with an amputation 
and then trying to correlate those sig-
nals to the control of multi-degree-of-
freedom prosthetic arms. While being 
intrigued by the idea of the interactive 
machine learning (iML) component of 
the study, I am not surprised that iML did 
not do noticeably better than standard 
approaches. The issue, as demonstrated 
by many researchers, is not our ability to 
do ML but rather the fundamental prob-
lem associated with using EMG as the 
inputs to the ML system and the clinical 
issues associated with stable acquisition 
of those signals.
« 1 » Markus nowak, Claudio Castellini 
and Carlo Massironi present a flawed argu-
ment for the problems of machine learning 
(ML) in EMG control of multifunctional 
upper-extremity (uE) prostheses. also, they 
present an engineering-/science-centric 
view of persons with amputations and how 
they use their prostheses as justification for 
the use of advanced ML techniques, with lit-
tle understanding of the clinical drivers for 
the current state of uE prostheses control.
« 2 » in §10 the authors claim that
“ machine learning tends to be used as a num-
ber-crunching black box, at which to throw as 
many examples as possible, hoping that it will 
yield a usable relationship between input data and 
target values. too often, scarce attention is paid 
to the quality, the origin and the meaning of the 
examples […]”
i claim that the authors and others are guilty 
of exactly this. if we stopped to consider the 
problem a little more, we might be able to 
achieve a different result.
« 3 » First, we need to consider the 
population for whom we hope to fabricate 
hands and arms. Persons with trans-radial 
(tR) level amputations make up more than 
70% of the upper-limb amputee population. 
For 99% of these individuals this is a uni-
lateral involvement. of this tR population 
80% will use some sort of prostheses. But 
the implication of the unilateral involve-
ment is that most people with an upper-
limb amputation still have a good limb that 
they will use, over their prosthesis, for most 
tasks. This makes the barrier to acceptance 
for uE prostheses very high and means that 
anything that is perceived as heavy, uncom-
fortable, bothersome, or a hassle will not be 
used.
« 4 » trans-humeral (tH) level aban-
donment rates tend to be higher because of 
the need for an elbow, which serves to iso-
late the hand from the residual limb. Here 
abandonment rates are at about 50%. This 
population makes up 10–15% of the uE 
population. so, when nowak et al. say in 
their abstract that “[d]espite more than 40 
years of academic research, myocontrol is 
still unsolved, with rejection rates of up to 
75%,” this appears to be a hyperbole used to 
justify their technology. i consider it not ac-
curate as it continues to propagate the myth 
that the current devices are not useful.
« 5 » second, we need to consider stan-
dard-of-care fitting practices and why we 
are where we are. The most common stan-
dard-of-care myoelectric (EMG control) 
fitting is a 2-site myoelectric prosthesis for 
persons with tR loss. Myoelectric systems 
have been widely accepted as a viable clini-
cal option since the 1980s and in particular 
the tR myoelectric fitting has found suc-
cess due to its cosmetic appeal, lack of sus-
pension straps and high grip strength, but 
system robustness, weight, and cost are still 
issues (atkins, Heard & donovan 1996). a 
standard 2-site myoelectric system is typi-
cally limited to 2 degrees of freedom (doF) 
with a co-contraction, or rate, used to switch 
between doF because, in general, one can 
only get 2–3 independent surface EMG sites 
on the residual limb of a trans-radial subject 
before cross-talk becomes an issue (ajiboye 
& Weir 2005). it is the limited number of 
control sites and the associated limit on the 
number of controllable doF that led inves-
tigators to explore other means of acquiring 
and using multi-doF control schemes such 
as ML. users certainly want more doFs, but 
not if it is a hassle.
« 6 » Pattern recognition (PR, which is 
what the field of prosthetics control calls ML) 
was first explored in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Herberts et al. 1973; Lawrence & Kadefors 
1974; taylor & Finley 1974) and reinvented 
in its current form in 1993 (Hudgins, Parker 
& scott 1993). since then it has undergone 
much development (Englehart & Hudgins 
2003; scheme & Englehart 2011; sensinger, 
Lock & Kuiken 2009; Farrell & Weir 2008a, 
2008b; simon, Lock & stubblefield 2012; 
Zhou et al. 2007) to get it to a point where it 
could transition to the clinic. PR algorithms 
seek to correlate patterns of EMG activity 
with a given/desired arm motion or hand 
posture. EMG signals are measured by an 
array of myoelectrodes on the residual limb. 
other “features” in addition to amplitude 
are extracted and correlation between the 
EMG activity pattern and a desired motion 
is determined by training an ML algorithm/
classifier with the extracted features for each 
EMG signal.
« 7 » Currently, a good ML/PR classifier 
can readily achieve about 90–95% accuracy. 
during training, patterns of muscle activity 
are recorded while the user holds a desired 
posture. Multiple trials are recorded for each 
posture. This has to be repeated for every 
desired posture. one can see how, if a large 
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number of different postures are desired 
with multiple trials for each posture, train-
ing the system can get tiresome for the user 
quickly. also, as currently implemented, PR 
is sequential in nature and users are limited 
to only those postures that they have trained 
the ML system to recognize. so far, because 
of this, PR techniques have met with little 
success outside the laboratory, so why is this 
so?
« 8 » Returning to the idea that the 
barrier to success is high for persons with 
unilateral amputations – the training is a 
bother that has limited pattern recognition 
adoption. People want to put on their pros-
thesis and go. They do not want extended 
training periods every time they don their 
arm and they do not want to then have to 
repeat the training throughout the day as 
the environment in their socket changes the 
electrode properties. as a result, it has taken 
a long time for PR systems to make it to the 
clinic.
« 9 » Third, we need to consider the 
nature of the EMG signal used for the con-
trol. The raw myoelectric (EMG) signal is 
a broadly Gaussian random signal whose 
amplitude increases with muscle contrac-
tion level. This signal needs amplification/ 
filtering/integrating/processing to extract 
the RMs value for use in amplitude-based 
myoelectric control (Childress & Weir 
2004; Parker & scott 1985). Filtering adds 
a delay to the system, decreasing system 
responsiveness, which, if excessive, frus-
trates the user. Furthermore, EMG control 
provides no feedback – myoelectric signals 
are recorded on the surface of the skin and 
sent out to the motor and nothing deliber-
ate comes back. incidental feedback in the 
form of motor whine and socket pressures 
are used by skilled users. Clinical issues 
such as motion artifact, skin impedance 
changes and electrode lift-off also present 
challenges that must be overcome during 
the fitting process.
« 10 » When using EMG signals as in-
puts to the ML algorithms, the random 
noisy nature of the EMG signals presents 
difficulties for ML classifiers of choice. small 
changes in electrode position can have a 
dramatic effect on the machine-learning/
classification accuracy. donning and doff-
ing the prosthesis can alter the classifica-
tion. as the number of degrees of freedom 
(doF) to be controlled increases, moving 
from one posture to another may result in 
overlapping muscle activity patterns, reduc-
ing the ability of the classifier to separate 
the EMG patterns. in addition, extrinsic 
factors such as electrode movement, elec-
trode lift-off, changes in skin impedance, or 
moving to positions outside of the initially 
trained position or using the prostheses un-
der varying loads or in different positions 
can all significantly degrade classifier per-
formance (Fougner et al. 2011). This makes 
it extremely difficult for PR systems to find 
success with users.
« 11 » Finally, we must understand that 
the goal of research into ML systems for uL 
prosthesis control is to build systems that 
will someday be worn by individuals with 
limb loss and that given what i said above 
in §§3f there are a host of clinical issues that 
will be ultimate drivers of success.
« 12 » The way Coapt, LLC, (Chicago, 
iL) was able to circumvent these issues and 
launch the first clinically successful pattern-
recognition system was to use an eight-elec-
trode system to control 1 doF in the hand 
(no grip patterns) and only 3 doF in total 
(hand, wrist, and elbow) (uellendahl & 
tyler 2016; Baschuk et al. 2016). This ena-
bles a user to do the “on-the-fly” training 
using Coapt’s prosthesis guided training 
(Lock et al. 2011; simon et al. 2011) system, 
which since users are only controlling 2–3 
doF, does not have onerously long training. 
in a field that has been locked into only 2 
electrodes as standard of care, Coapt’s ap-
proach of providing a system of 8 integrated 
myoelectrodes to control 2 doF is changing 
how clinicians and researchers are thinking 
about the provision of myoelectric care.
« 13 » What we see is that it was a 
knowledge of the field and the population 
to be fitted, as well as a clinically viable way 
to allow training by users on the go that en-
abled the Coapt system to move from the 
laboratory to the field. The ML algorithm 
Coapt uses is not sophisticated, just good 
enough, because it is not the determinant 
for success. What we see in ML/PR is that 
by using every available technique (includ-
ing fuzzy logic, linear discriminant analysis 
(Lda), principal component analysis, non-
negative matrix factorization, self-organiz-
ing feature maps, support vector machines, 
random forests, cepstral constants, neural 
networks, and multinomial regression) a 
classification accuracy of about 90–95% can 
be achieved but not more. so, in the field of 
prosthetics control, the Lda classifier with 
a time-domain feature set or auto-regressive 
constants has become the standard, because 
it is low cost from a computational perspec-
tive, easy to implement, and is as good as 
anything else. Could the authors expand on 
the feature set as well as the actual classifier 
they used? There was a lack of detail on the 
actual classifier used and no mention of the 
features used to train the classifier.
« 14 » so, bottom line, the interactive 
aspect of the iML trial is an interesting con-
cept in the target article, and ought to be a 
good thing in the long run. talking to the 
subject and telling them as the training ses-
sion progresses that a training movement 
is “good” or “bad” and then only using the 
“good” training datasets to build the classi-
fier ought to bias the classifier training da-
taset to “good” examples. But when i read 
that ultimately the iML pilot study results 
did not show much improvement it did not 
surprise me. it is hard to get beyond the 
90–95% classification accuracy rate, since 
this is most likely a consequence of the poor 
properties of the EMG signals used as the 
system inputs. We need to do something 
different with the EMG signals or integrate 
them with other types of input signals.
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> upshot • The stripped-down experi-
mental setup may be missing impor-
tant sensory proprioceptive and tactile 
observables that may well be crucial for 
designing useful, effective, and flexible 
general-purpose motor prosthetic de-
vices. Because trainable machines can-
not by themselves add new observables, 
designers must foresee which ones are 
needed.
« 1 » Motor substitution – the replace-
ment of organic effector organs with arti-
ficial ones – has long been stymied by the 
problem of control – how to effectively con-
trol the artificial muscles using neural and/
or muscle signals that are produced by the 
human operator. Markus nowak, Claudio 
Castellini and Carlo Massironi address the 
problem of controlling arms and hands via 
muscle activation signals (myocontrol) ob-
served via electrical sensors (upper arm 
electromyography (EMG)).
« 2 » Their target article focuses on the 
human-machine feedback loops in play 
when one has a human training and operat-
ing an adaptive prosthetic device. after first 
introducing machine-learning schemes, the 
discussion quickly moves away from the 
ultimate problem of effective motor substi-
tution and into the stripped-down experi-
mental setup, where an adaptive machine 
controller is trained to produce a small set 
of six alternative discrete static wrist-hand 
positions (§51: rest/no-action, wrist supi-
nation, extension, flexion, pronation, and 
hand-closing). The adaptive controller de-
cides how to move a simulated hand given 
a particular goal (a target wrist-position 
category) and the eight-channel EMG out-
put of the Myo bracelet (§42), which here is 
worn by normal subjects with intact upper 
limbs. The main focus of the target article is 
on the role of human-machine interactions 
during different stagings of model building 
and training phases.
« 3 » Effectively solving the problem 
of motor substitution will substantially en-
hance the lives of many people, and i think 
the limited experiments outlined here are 
well worth pursuing. innovations in design 
strategies and how we think about them also 
have large ripple effects in other domains, 
such that bringing constructivist ideas to 
the design process have implications far 
beyond prosthetic devices (as i say, all tech-
nology is prosthesis, in that every technology 
that is meaningful is some amplification or 
augmentation of our biological, bodily and 
mental functionalities).
motor control under natural 
vs. experimental conditions
« 4 » in order to understand the experi-
mental setup, i found it necessary to draw 
schematics that depict the functional orga-
nizations of humans with intact upper limbs 
vs. those of the trainable machines that are 
considered here (Figure  1). The first order 
of business when evaluating a system that is 
designed to operate in non-virtual realms is 
to examine its goals (the functions it imple-
ments, whether for itself or in service of a 
designer’s goals), what its observables (mea-
surements, realized through sensors) and 
modes of action (realized through effectors) 
are, and how these are coordinated (how 
percept-action mappings are determined). 
These are the basic functionalities of any 
purposive, percept-coordination-action sys-
tem (Cariani 1989, 2011, 2015). a system 
is purposive by virtue of embedded goals, 
evaluation mechanisms for assessing wheth-
er goals are attained (satisfied) or better 
performed, and means of directing or steer-
ing behavior to better attain goals. For each 
goal, the steering mechanism consists of a 
percept-action mapping, i.e., how the sys-
tem should behave given its sensory inputs 
(its-current-observed-state-of-its-environ-
ment) given that current goal. such a system 
has agency vis-à-vis that goal if it has the 
autonomy to pursue attainment of that goal.
« 5 » in the target article, we have two 
adaptive, purposive percept-coordination-
action systems that interact to train each 
other, namely the human operator and 
the trainable prosthetic device. This could 
be seen as two problems of first-order cy-
bernetics: how does the human best give 
evaluative feedback that trains the machine 
to recognize different muscle activation 
patterns (EMG signals), and how does the 
machine train the human to modify pat-
terns of muscle activations such that it can 
better classify the signals? Provided that the 
two systems have enough variety in their re-
sponses and in channels that mediate their 
communications for mutual adaptation to 
be possible and functionally beneficial, we 
can also view this as one problem of second-
order cybernetics in which the dynamics of 
the interactions might be crucial.
« 6 » However, whether the order of 
interactions ultimately matters in improv-
ing the quality of prosthetic movements 
may depend on whether there is room for 
improvement. if the human user cannot ef-
fectively learn to change muscle activation 
patterns that are observable via the eight 
channels of EMG or the trainable machine 
is already exploiting the limited data it has 
to the fullest, then not much benefit in pros-
thetic function may be gained from modify-
ing sequences of model building and testing. 
if i understand Figure 8 correctly, the mean 
hand-configuration errors (nRMsE), which 
quantify the similarity of the hand positions 
produced by trainable classifier with the 
target hand positions, should be improving 
with training. However, no such trend in 
the error metric is seen for any of the three 
experimental protocols over the course of 
90 trials. This could possibly be indicative 
of a ceiling effect – the classifier rapidly 
achieves its optimal performance such that 
further training does not help and also that 
the potential benefits of modifications of the 
training-test protocol are hidden. as the au-
thors note (§§80f), there are also additional 
subjective factors, such as perceived muscle 
fatigue, smoother interaction, and positive 
impressions of prosthesis operation that are 
entirely relevant to patient acceptance and 
use that may be amenable to improvement 
by adjusting training and testing protocols.
« 7 » it could be the case that including 
additional physiological observables would 
permit higher optimal levels of functioning 
that could benefit from mutual adaptation. 
Choice of observables – measurements to 
be made – is the most important decision to 
be made in constructing a predictive model, 
and choice of feature primitives is likewise 
the most important decision in designing 
a trainable classifier. in general, choosing 
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what measurements to make, however, is an 
ill-defined, unformalizable, domain-specific 
problem for which there are no effective pro-
cedures other than building new measuring 
devices and trying them out. in practice, 
designers think of as many possible relevant 
observables as they can and then eliminate 
those feature primitives that yield no ben-
efit. Biological systems have solved this fun-
damental problem by evolving new sensory 
receptors, modes of neural coordination, 
new effectors, and new possibilities for ac-
tion. Long ago (Cariani 1989), i proposed 
a class of biologically inspired devices that 
would adaptively build their own hardware 
including their sensors, coordinative parts, 
and effectors such that they would construct 
their own primitives, thereby solving the 
problem, in principle at least, of finding the 
right ones.
« 8 » a machine-learning classifier can 
only be as good as its feature primitives and 
a machine-learning controller can only be as 
good as its set of possible actions. a train-
able machine does not have the means of 
creating new feature or action primitives, 
such that it is prisoner to the sets of sen-
sors and effectors its designer chooses for it. 
Without adequate variety in these domains, 
such systems can learn up to a point, but 
they will be ultimately constrained by the 
limitations of their pre-specified sets of fea-
tures and actions.
« 9 » When tackling a problem in bi-
onics, and especially when troubleshooting 
why artificial prostheses do not work as well 
as their biological counterparts, it is useful 
to first compare the functional organization 
and operational structure (physiology) of 
the two systems. My concerns as a physi-
ologist, systems scientist, and cybernetician 
would be what the experimental setup is 
leaving out in terms of observables, actions, 
and feedbacks.
« 10 » in the normal, intact biological 
case (Figure 1, left), a human (or animal) has 
a number of sensory channels that provide 
critical feedback for movement and posi-
tioning of limbs. Perhaps most importantly, 
humans and animals have proprioceptive 
feedback that provides information about 
the limb positions and muscle stretch. i once 
worked on the problem of spinal cord regen-
eration (Wang et al. 2008), which involved 
facilitating the regrowth of neural connec-
tions between proprioceptive afferents and 
their associated sensory pathways in the spi-
nal cord. despite intact muscles and motor 
neurons, rats deprived of neural signals in 
forelimb afferents completely lose the use of 
their forelimbs, but once these connections 
are restored, functions also return. Humans 
who have lost their proprioceptive afferents 
through disease have great difficulty execut-
ing movements such as walking, and only 
through concerted, sustained attentional 
effort can they learn to use visual feedback 
to guide their limbs. in many common situ-
ations, we can also benefit from tactile feed-
back. There are also thought to be neural 
efferent copy signals that provide the brain 
with copies of the command signals that 
are activating muscles. as far as i can tell, 
the present prosthetic setup involves only 
eight channels of EMG data that would be 
analogous to using motor command sig-
nals or their efferent copies. There is thus 
visual feedback, which may be adequate for 
simple, static hand positions, but there is no 
proprioceptive or tactile feedback, which 
might be necessary for flexible movements 
or grasps. if i were involved in the problem 
of designing a flexible, general-purpose 
prosthetic device, i would look first to incor-
porating proprioceptive and tactile feedback 
signals from artificial hands and arms into 
prosthetic controllers (Ciancio et al. 2016). 
incorporating whole new classes of observ-
ables is, of course, a much more formidable 
task for an experimenter, so it is entirely 
understandable why the experimental setup 
reported here would not (yet) include them.
understanding the experiments
« 11 » The experimental setup in the tar-
get article is complicated to the uninitiated 
and is confusing to sort out, especially if one 
is more focused on the motor substitution 
problem than on human-machine interac-
tions. The nature, adequacy, robustness, and 
informational content of the eight channels 
of EMG data and the effects of alternative 
machine-learning algorithms are never 
spelled out in detail: are they operating 
on time-series EMG data? How similar are 
Human (without prosthesis) Trainable prosthetic
Effectors:
Muscles
Sensors:
Internal neural
efferent copy
Proprioceptive
Tactile
Visual
Coordinator:
Nervous system
Hand
position
Goal: Target
Hand position
Evaluation
of performance
Self-
modification
Sensors:
EMG
8-channel
myo bracelet
Coordinator:
Trainable machine
Simulated
hand position
Goal: Target
Hand position
Evaluation
of performance
Self-
modification
Figure 1 • Functional organization of human upper arm control (left) compared with the train-
able prosthetic used in the experiments (right). Sensors that carry out measurement operations 
are indicated by circles, coordinations that map input sensory states to output decision states 
by boxes, and effectors that carry out actions by triangles. Arrows indicate causal chains of ef-
fects. Black arrow indicates goal directive (task target). Gray arrow indicates evaluative feed-
back about the efficacy of the last action (measurement of performance) and the operation of 
modifying percept-action mappings. Note that the experimental setup is highly impoverished 
in terms of sensory observables for feedback control and possible action states (many vs 6 hand 
positions). 
269
choosing the right observables  peter cariani
Radical Constructivism
               http://constructivist.info/13/2/250.nowak
signals from amputees and non-amputees? 
How many independent dimensions or 
distinctions can they convey? does perfor-
mance using the Myo bracelet data depend 
critically on the type of machine-learning 
algorithm that is used? However, these con-
siderations may be critical for interpreting 
these results and for solving the more gen-
eral problem of designing prosthetic devices 
that are going to be practically useful to 
their users. There are many detailed techni-
cal questions that can be asked concerning 
the transferability of findings from the ex-
perimental setup to the practical situations 
of amputees who will use such devices.
« 12 » The multiple means of evaluation 
and sequencing of performance and train-
ing trials further complicate understand-
ing. Multiple means of evaluative feedback 
included human subjects seeing their own 
hands or seeing simulated hands on a com-
puter screen and giving good/bad judge-
ments vs. machine-based distance geometry 
metrics (nRMsE) of hand configuration 
similarity. However, was the nRMsE met-
ric used directly in some cases to train the 
machine or was the training feedback always 
from the human operator (good/bad) and 
the nRMsE simply used as a non-subjective 
(intersubjectively verifiable) measure of the 
accuracy of the system? (Q1)
« 13 » in §22 interactive machine learn-
ing (iML) is contrasted with good-old-
fashioned machine learning (ML) in that a 
human operator, rather than some com-
pletely artificial evaluation process, provides 
physiological observables (eight channels of 
upper arm EMG) and feedback to the train-
able classifier/controller (as seen in Figure 2 
of the target article). in this case, it seems 
that by far the most important role for the 
humans in this setup is to provide the EMG 
patterns (via the Myo bracelet cuff on the 
operator’s right arm) that will be classified 
by the trainable machine to generate simu-
lated hand positions. in this situation we 
have two adaptive systems, the operator, 
who may be learning to adjust muscle ac-
tions in order to steer the trainable machine 
to produce more appropriate hand posi-
tions, and the trainable machine, which is 
simultaneously updating its classification of 
the EMG data based on the evaluative feed-
back it receives from the user. Given that 
the evaluations of six simulated hand posi-
tions by human trainers are binary decisions 
(good/bad) concerning the similarity of 
target and produced (the 3d simulated and 
visually rendered and displayed images in 
the figure) hand positions, could the evalu-
ative feedback have been easily replaced by 
the nRMsE distance-geometry metric? (Q2)
« 14 » on the other hand, perhaps the 
main rationale for making the human op-
erator give explicit feedback is to focus the 
operator’s attention on the task and to pro-
vide greater reward when desired actions are 
obtained. From the increasing separations of 
the EMG patterns depicted in Figure 9, the 
training of the human operator did appear 
to significantly modify the EMG signals that 
are picked up from the Myo bracelet. one 
would think that this greater separation 
of input signals would cause the system to 
make fewer confusions that produce clas-
sification errors. However, as the authors 
remark (§88), the effects of training on per-
formance appear to be minimal. The time 
course of the position-error metric (mean 
nRMsE) in Figure 8 shows no obvious im-
provement with training (trial 1 to trial 90). 
The hand-position separations at the first 
and last trials for best and worst perform-
ers in Figure 10 similarly show little obvious 
improvement.
« 15 » in summary, it appears that most 
of the effectiveness of the prosthetic classi-
fier-controller is due to its ability to sepa-
rate the EMG patterns without the benefit 
of human evaluative feedback. in these ex-
periments, the human operator is critical in 
the generation of the EMG patterns but not 
essential for giving the trainable machine 
feedback. nevertheless, i agree with the 
authors that interactive machine learning, 
which gives the user control over when and 
under what circumstances to update the in-
put-output function of the machine, is nev-
ertheless likely to be a promising strategy for 
prosthetic design.
realist vs. constructivist 
approaches to design
« 16 » some sections of the target article 
(§§34–37) discuss the effects of epistemol-
ogy on design. We humans are all self-mod-
ifying, self-constructing systems, whereas 
most of our artificial systems are not. Ma-
chine-learning systems, to the extent that 
they do self-modify and self-construct, do 
so within much more constrained avenues 
of possible modifications than we humans 
and animals do. on the other hand, we can 
be clearer about what is going on within the 
trainable machine than we can about what 
is going on in the minds of its designers. 
i tend to prefer to talk about the capabili-
ties and limitations of self-constructing vs. 
non-constructing systems rather than de-
sign paradigms, which reside in the heads 
of human designers, as important as these 
can be.
« 17 » it is possible to talk in terms of 
(realist) ontology-based design (§§3–12), 
where a physical or virtual world with a de-
scription that is meant to be complete is first 
postulated, and then a system within that 
world is specified to have some sort of ef-
fective behavior that fulfills some function. 
Partial, often statistical, observations of this 
“god’s eye” universe by limited actors are 
then overlaid onto this postulated world. 
Three basic types of realism are physical re-
alism, mathematical realism (platonic ideal-
ism), and logical realism (propositional ob-
jectivism). in realism, an objective world of 
one sort or another is held to exist indepen-
dently of any observers, such that realists 
find it meaningful to talk in terms of “true” 
knowledge of the details of this world even 
apart from how one would observe them.
« 18 » an alternative to realism is to take 
an epistemological approach in which one 
adopts the perspective of a limited observer-
actor. The observer-actor strives to achieve 
particular ends, such as predicting future 
events or bringing about particular desir-
able events), given limited means of observ-
ing the world and acting on it. The observer-
actor, without needing an explicit ontology 
or access to any unobserved world-states, 
forms a (non-referentialist) model for effec-
tive prediction and action that then guides 
expectations and actions. This model is 
based entirely on tangible observations and 
evaluations.
« 19 » although i have no evidence for 
this assertion, i would think that realist 
designers would be more inclined to try to 
design devices directly, from physical prin-
ciples, whereas constructivists would be in-
clined towards making devices adaptive and 
semi-autonomous, such that they construct 
their own effective means for anticipation 
and action.
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> upshot • Applying radical constructiv-
ism to machine learning is a challenge 
that requires us to dive very deeply into 
its theory of knowing and learning. We 
need to clarify its fundamental concepts, 
if possible, in operational terms. This 
commentary aims at outlining how this 
kind of clarification could look in the case 
of 3 such concepts: (a) the construction 
of experiential reality; (b) learning as a 
constructive activity; (c) the viability of 
conceptual structures.
introduction
« 1 » one of the major experiences 
that led Ernst von Glasersfeld to adopt 
a constructivist way of thinking was his 
pioneering work in artificial intelligence, 
starting in 1959 with the machine transla-
tion project at the Centre for Cybernetics 
at the university of Milan, created and di-
rected by silvio Ceccato (Glasersfeld 1995: 
7). Thus, i am rather enthusiastic about the 
idea of applying von Glasersfeld’s theory of 
knowing and learning to machine learning 
(ML) and hope that my comments will sup-
port the efforts of Markus nowak, Claudio 
Castellini and Carlo Massironi in continu-
ing this promising line of research.
« 2 » in the field of assistive robotics 
for limb amputees, electromyographic sig-
nals generated by muscle activity in the re-
maining upper limb are used as input data 
for a machine learning (ML) system; the 
system should then produce control com-
mands for a prosthetic arm/hand accord-
ingly in order to let it perform the desired 
action (§33).
« 3 » unfortunately, this so-called 
upper-limb myocontrol, after 40 years 
of research, is still failing (§34) with re-
jection rates of up to 75%. as a means of 
improving such systems (smart prosthetic 
arm/hand control systems), the authors of 
the target article suggest (§32) develop-
ing traditional ML to form an interactive 
machine learning (iML), which allows for 
system updates whenever its actions are 
unsatisfactory (§§21f). But this poses new 
problems, which require appropriate con-
ceptual tools, in particular, a coherent con-
ceptual framework about interactivity. This 
is where the authors anticipate that radical 
constructivism (RC) could help (§23), es-
pecially through its concepts of experien-
tial reality (§15), learning as a constructive 
activity (§16), viability (§17), assimilation, 
scheme theory, accommodation and equili-
bration (§30).
« 4 » The application of RC to iML – so 
called RC-framed iML – for the task of up-
per-limb prosthesis is expected to provide 
useful insight into how to design the inter-
active prosthesis of the future (§89). The 
authors are convinced that their approach 
has the potential to improve human-robot 
interaction. Thus, they propose to shift 
the attitude towards ML from a realist to 
a radical constructivist attitude, as defined 
by von Glasersfeld (§13). They see their 
draft of an RC-framed iML presented in 
the target article, as an attempt at opening a 
discussion between the RC community and 
the ML community (§26).
« 5 » applying RC to ML requires us to 
dive very deeply into radical constructiv-
ism and clarify its fundamental concepts. 
so, i will look at three fundamental con-
cepts used in what the target article calls a 
“tentative framework” (§26) about “inter-
activity” (§23) and will try to dive deeper 
into them.
a | the construction of experiential 
reality
« 6 » nowak et al. mention this con-
cept and quote von Glasersfeld (1995: 58f) 
as a reference where it appears as a section 
title. i will highlight the essential parts of 
this section by not only repeating the same 
formulation but also by reformulating and 
extending them in my own terms.
« 7 » Humans, as infants and later as 
adults, can construct the reality they expe-
rience for themselves. as infants, humans 
develop the basic concepts that constitute 
the essential structure of their individual 
experiential reality, without needing a spe-
cific physical structure to exist in its own 
right as a corresponding structure.
« 8 » For example, let us look at the de-
velopment of the notion of the “object” in 
a human infant. in phase 1, the infant co-
ordinates sensory signals recurrently avail-
able at the same time in its sensory field 
(the “locus” of raw material that immanuel 
Kant called “the manifold”) and establishes 
by that many different object concepts; 
these object concepts are like operational 
routines for constructing the formerly con-
structed objects of interest again at a later 
point (a ball, a face, a cat, etc.) whenever 
suitable sensory components are available. 
The notion of “object” in general, then, is 
whatever the mind constructs as common 
to all these routines (a kind of abstract, 
generalised, operational routine) due to a 
principle of efficiency, implemented like in 
perception by means of “preferred paths” 
or “sequence patterns” (de Bono 1991: 81f; 
de Bono 1992: 10f). Later, in phase 2, the 
infant becomes able to run through such 
operational routines even when no suitable 
sensory components are available in its sen-
sory field; in this case, the infant executes 
a conceptual coordination of a previously 
constructed object; it produces a re-pre-
sentation (written with the hyphen as a re-
minder that this term means a repetition, a 
replay, a re-construction from memory, of a 
past experience, not a picture of something 
in a mind-independent world).
« 9 » Thus, i do not agree with nowak 
et al. when they say that the agent tries to 
“organize perceptual objects” (§15). Rather, 
i would avoid both “perceptual” and “ob-
jects” and say that the agent “organises a 
sensory field,” conceived as the raw material 
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that Kant called “the manifold,” in which 
there are no objects unless we construct 
them. and when we have constructed them, 
i would not assign them to the sensory field 
but rather to our experiential reality, and 
there to a process that operates at a higher 
operational level. it is similar to looking at 
the skies on a clear night: you can only see 
an ordered pattern of stars, even a constella-
tion, if you organise the single stars (the sig-
nals in your sensory field) by selecting some 
and connecting them, thus constructing the 
pattern in your mind rather than perceiv-
ing it (Glasersfeld 1999: 12; Bettoni & Eggs 
2010: 133).
« 10 » Moreover, the essence of a “very 
radical-constructivist concept” here is not 
dealing with “‘perceptual’ data” (§15) but 
that the “object” as a generic concept, as a 
conceptual structure (and later many oth-
ers), is constructed by organising a sensory 
manifold in many different ways and later 
by abstracting what is common to these 
previously constructed conceptual struc-
tures.
B | learning as a constructive 
activity
« 11 » This concept used in the target 
article (§16) references an early article by 
von Glasersfeld (1983) of the same title. 
But i would not say that this early article 
presents “matching ‘perceptual’ patterns” as 
a foundation of RC. since the fundamental 
epistemological principle of RC is “fit” not 
“match” (“viability” not “correspondence”), 
i would suggest avoiding the use of “match” 
altogether, even when it refers to sensory 
patterns or conceptual structures and not to 
pictures of the physical world.
« 12 » an elementary form of learning 
requires two components (Glasersfeld 1995: 
152f):
  something like a memory,
  the ability to compare two signals, a 
present one and a goal-signal that con-
stitutes a reference value.
once these requirements are met, the pre-
conditions of inductive learning are satis-
fied. in the event of a perturbation, all that 
is further needed for this elementary form 
of learning to occur is a rule or principle 
that leads the system to repeat actions that 
were recorded as successful in its past ex-
perience (see also de Bono 1991: 42f), thus 
reducing or eliminating this kind of new 
perturbation.
« 13 » although the interactions the 
subject has had with the world shape what 
will be the result of new interactions (§18), 
the previous knowledge that they provide 
is not enough for the re-cognition of a cer-
tain situation (§19; Glasersfeld 1995: 65). in 
fact, the sensory field provides vastly more 
signals than those needed for its segmenta-
tion. The organism must therefore always 
actively select which signals to use in order 
to construct either a known or a new pat-
tern that will trigger a particular scheme, 
so that the pattern can be assimilated. 
How can the agent do this active selection? 
i agree with von Glasersfeld (1995: 78f) 
that Ceccato’s idea of an attentional system 
(Ceccato 1964) that produces successive 
pulses of attention and has the ability to 
form combinatorial patterns of attentional 
moments, can provide a model of how the 
mind actively selects signals in the sensory 
field. These pulses of attention, which i have 
called “attentional quanta” (Bettoni 2018), 
also constitute the operational structure of 
abstract concepts (Glasersfeld 1995: 167f). 
Could Ceccato’s attentional system also be 
implemented in the ML system for enabling 
it to do the needed active selection?
« 14 » Whenever a scheme is activated 
and the triggered activity does not yield the 
expected result, the discrepancy between 
expectation (reference value) and the expe-
rienced result creates a perturbation in the 
system. This perturbation is equivalent to a 
variation of the input into a controller unit 
of a control loop with negative feedback 
(cybernetics, control engineering). it is a 
novel kind of perturbation; it is not associ-
ated with a specific sensory pattern or with 
a specific scheme and may lead to an ac-
commodation, an adjustment of the scheme 
or the formation of a new one. in this way, 
assimilation and accommodation enable an 
agent to learn.
c | the viability of conceptual 
structures
« 15 » i agree that we cannot “build a 
real model of this world” (§17) but i dis-
agree with saying that we can “build a vi-
able representation of it” because, again, our 
conceptual structures cannot be said to rep-
resent a real mind-independent world. They 
merely fit with our own experience and they 
are viable as means for consistently organis-
ing our experience (Glasersfeld 1983).
« 16 » in order to dive deeper into the 
concept of viability, i suggest making use 
of the language of cybernetics and control 
engineering. This allows us to illustrate the 
concept of viability by means of a system 
model (see Figure  1) where we have one 
control unit that controls two process units; 
it is a very peculiar architecture of a coupled 
control system with two fundamentally dif-
ferent processes and hence two fundamen-
tally different, but coupled, control loops.
The control loop of physical reality
« 17 » on the right-hand side of the 
diagram, i differentiate between reality as 
a physical controlled system or process, the 
person as its controller and two interactions 
between these two units: the physical effect 
UE UP
YE
w YP
Experiential reality Physical reality
Control unit
e
Figure 1 • The cybernetic model of viability: A coupled system of two processes controlled by one 
control unit. Abbreviations: Y = controlled variable; w = set point variable; e = control deviation; 
U = manipulated variable; index E = experiential reality; index P = physical reality.
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of a person on reality (controller output, 
manipulated variable UP) and the physical 
effect of this reality1 on a person (controller 
input, controlled variable YP).
« 18 » The controlled variable YP only 
affects the person in the form of a manifold 
(Kant 1966: B 102; Glasersfeld 1995: 40f), 
i.e., in an unstructured manner. in the dia-
gram, this is indicated by the fact that the 
arrow ends at the periphery of the control 
unit and does not penetrate into the inner 
circle, like the other variables.
The control loop of experiential 
reality
« 19 » on the left-hand side of the dia-
gram, i differentiate between the experien-
tial world as the entirety of the experiences 
acquired by a person (her knowledge base) 
and the person as the controller in the form 
of a separate unit; this separation is purely 
heuristic in nature for illustrative purposes. 
in this model, i also assign to the experien-
tial world the role of a controlled system, 
but a conceptual (conceptually construct-
ed) rather than a physical controlled sys-
tem.
« 20 » There are three interactions be-
tween these two units here: the conceptual 
effect of a person’s control unit on her ex-
periential world (manipulated variable UE) 
and two conceptual effects of the experi-
ential world on the person’s control unit. 
The set point variable w corresponds to 
the goals, intentions and expectations. The 
controlled variable YE is somewhat more 
complicated: a person takes the controlled 
variable YP, transforms it into thought con-
tent (manipulated variable UE), seeks to in-
tegrate this into her experiential world (as-
similation, accommodation etc.) and ends 
up with the controlled variable YE.
« 21 » The control deviation e is formed 
from a comparison between the set point 
variable w and the controlled variable YE; 
this produces a binary variable e, which 
provides information as to whether or not 
there are any obstacles in the way of pursu-
ing the goals, i.e., whether or not the cur-
rent state can be deemed viable. if the ma-
1 | By “physical reality” i mean the world of 
constraints in which organisms live (Glasersfeld 
1983) and by “physical effect” i mean variations in 
the sensory field due to those constraints.
nipulated variable UP has led to a solution 
or generates any concepts that are either 
compatible with existing conceptual struc-
tures (lack of contradictions) or in harmo-
ny with conceptual structures that others 
regard as viable, then in the control unit we 
will obtain e = 0, i.e., the current state will 
be considered viable and will be reinforced.
conclusion
« 22 »  diving deeper into concepts such 
as the construction of experiential reality and 
learning as constructive activity ensures that 
the development of an RC-framed iML will 
be more consistent with RC. Furthermore, 
due to the central role assigned to interac-
tivity by an iML approach, the double-loop 
model of viability presented here could be-
come the starting point or foundation for 
developing the missing “coherent concep-
tual framework about interactivity” that ML 
needs (§23). Here the model deals with a 
human-world interaction, where the human 
is the active agent and the world provides 
constraints. in ML the roles are swapped: we 
have to model an ML-human interaction, 
where the ML system is the active agent and 
the constraints are provided by the human 
(§30).
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a sociocultural perspective 
for learning loops
Marco Guicciardi
Università degli Studi di Cagliari, Italy 
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> upshot • I point out that from a socio-
cultural perspective, repeated experien-
tial interaction loops are not enough for 
constructing new context-dependent 
knowledge: the loops must be grounded 
in specific social practices, which are ei-
ther culturally or historically situated. 
Also, to tightly connect human user and 
interactive machine-learning system, 
triple-loop learning needs to be used as 
well as criteria for validating an expecta-
tion’s confirmation.
« 1 » The improved interaction between 
users and learning systems in interactive 
machine learning (iML) needs a better un-
derstanding of how end-user involvement 
impacts the learning process (amershi et al. 
2014). to contribute to the discussion that 
Markus nowak, Claudio Castellini and Car-
lo Massironi have opened, i want to high-
light some properties of this interaction.
« 2 » Gregory Bateson (1979: 78) point-
ed out that one cannot hear the sound of one 
hand  clapping. Likewise, the contributions 
of the human and the iML system to solving 
these problems cannot be decoupled. Thus, 
in iML we have to put the “human into the 
loop” (Holzinger 2016) to enable what nei-
ther a human nor a computer could do on 
their own.
« 3 » a conventional machine-learning 
(ML) system can be instructed with ever 
more examples when learning a stationary 
process (§12). Human behavior, however, is 
non-stationary (§29) and biomedical data 
sets are full of uncertainty and incomplete-
ness (e.g., missing data, noisy data, etc.), 
which makes the application of convention-
al ML difficult or even impossible (Holzin-
ger 2016).
« 4 » since human and iML system 
are tightly coupled, some form of reflexiv-
ity is required to take into account the re-
lationship that includes both elements as 
a part of it. as Erving Goffman (1974: 85) 
states, “a reflexive element must necessarily 
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be present in any participant’s clearheaded 
view  of events; a  correct view of a scene 
must include the viewing of it as part of it.”
« 5 » What kind of relationship do we 
have to take into account if every descrip-
tion implies an observer who describes it 
(Foerster 1981: 258)? obviously, reflexivity 
is not confined only to our observed inter-
action between human and iML system, but 
extends to a different level that also includes 
us as knowing subjects. For example, in 
§47ff the authors build a psychological con-
text of interaction rules and reciprocal roles 
for the human – reassuring that the prosthe-
sis learning ability was “only in its infancy” 
– which also involves readers who identify 
with this parental role.
« 6 » We can find another example of 
reflexivity in §37, where the authors claim 
that iML, based on radical constructivism, 
is superior to conventional realist ML. But 
who is the knowing subject in the experi-
ment described afterwards (§§38ff): the iML 
system (here the learner) or the human (here 
the user) who adopts a non-realist theory of 
knowledge? or both? The interaction loops 
increase the opportunities for users to im-
pact the learner and, in turn, for the learner 
to impact the users (amershi et al. 2014).
« 7 » Can we assume that the human, 
while providing feedback to the iML sys-
tem, is developing a better awareness of her 
knowledge constructs? does the iML sys-
tem build on cultural knowledge thanks to 
the feedback provided by the human? Can 
the human and iML system create, togeth-
er, new knowledge outside a social context 
where distances, shapes and sizes are cultur-
ally defined?
« 8 » an iML system can be conceived 
as a constructivist system that generates a 
certain kind of knowledge through experi-
ential interaction loops (sarkar 2016). This is 
how the prosthetic hand learns movements, 
i.e., by means of acquiring correct examples 
and feedback (§57ff). However, i claim that 
repeated experiential interaction loops are 
not enough for constructing new knowl-
edge: the loops must be grounded in specific 
social practices, which are either culturally 
or historically situated. These practices are 
governed by constraints, in which people 
engage with “objects” or other constructed 
entities, understood in terms of apparently 
independent, decontextualized properties. 
as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann 
(1967: 61) observed, humans are capable of 
producing a world that they then experience 
as something other than a human product 
(see also Packer & Goicoechea 2000).
« 9 » so, assuming a sociocultural per-
spective, activities are characterized as prac-
tices of a community. There are many dif-
ferent ways of moving a hand, because, as 
Goffman observed:
“ […] while the substratum of a gesture derives 
from the maker’s body, the form of the gesture can 
be intimately determined by the microecological 
orbit in which the speaker finds himself. to de-
scribe the gesture, let alone uncover its meaning, 
we might then have to introduce the human and 
material setting in which the gesture is made.” 
(Goffman 1964: 133)
« 10 » in order to execute an action such 
as grasping a cup of tea or repairing a bicy-
cle, in addition to movements and validated 
procedures, does an iML have to learn some-
thing about the “frame” (Goffman 1974), 
i.e., the human and material setting in which 
the action has to be executed? (Q1). For the 
experiment described in §§38ff this means 
the prosthetic hand’s activity requires a rich 
context where meaning can be negotiated, 
and understanding can emerge and evolve 
(sarkar 2016).
« 11 » in order to establish a tight cou-
pling between a human and her iML system, 
we need triple-loop learning that is able to 
transcend single- and double-loop learning:
  single-loop learning occurs when the 
system learns new skills and capabilities 
through incremental improvement: the 
system assimilates the information that 
it can already recognize. Errors are de-
tected and corrected by a human agent, 
who acts without perturbing the system 
(see also, in §53, the evaluation phase of 
experiment 0).
  double-loop learning is reflective and 
occurs when errors are detected and 
corrected, and expectations, and/or as-
sumptions are called into question and 
challenged. as nowak et al. report in 
§59ff (Experiments 1 and 2), when deal-
ing with complex, non-programmable 
issues, the iML system was perturbed. 
The concept of perturbation refers to a 
stimulus that does not conform, or gen-
tly subverts, the expectations and men-
tal model of the users, forcing them to 
construct new knowledge in order to 
accommodate this experience (sarkar 
2016). Error detection still occurs, but 
the iML system is required to change its 
assumptions and mental model to try to 
understand the “connecting structure” 
(Bateson 1979) that helps to detect these 
errors.
  triple-loop learning involves a learning 
framework where “the subject learns the 
context of the action and how these ac-
tions are connected to the world” (Lut-
terer 2012). Here we must include the 
context, because movements and men-
tal processes are formed in and through 
participation in specific social practices, 
which can be both culturally and his-
torically situated (Packer & Goicoechea 
2000). Learning to move a hand is also, 
and always, a learning of context (Bate-
son 1972: 293): activity is dialectically 
constituted in relation to the setting 
(Lave 1988: 151).
« 12 » Figure 1 shows how the relation-
ship between the three loops of learning can 
Learning
framework
Mental models,
assumptions
Actions
Single-loop
Double-loop
Consequences
Triple-loop
Figure 1 • Learning loops (Modified from “Modes of organizational learning” by Soren Eilertsen and 
Kellan London, https://le2oa.wikispaces.com/file/view/Modes+of+Organisational+Learning.pdf)
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be depicted. Each successive loop extends 
beyond the boundary of, and includes, the 
previous loop.
« 13 » Coming back to the experiments 
in the target article, positive feedback or 
confirming a prediction strengthens the ex-
periential reality that the human and iML 
system are constructing together. in §52, 
during model building, all the instantiations 
are supposed to be “good” signals. in other 
words, the human confirms the expecta-
tions of the system, which was building its 
own “reality.” Furthermore, during model 
testing, whenever a particular prediction 
concerning an action or reaction of the oth-
er turns out to be corroborated by what the 
other does, this strengthens, in a different 
loop, the experiential reality and the mental 
models that both are constructing together.
« 14 » since prediction is different from 
explanation, in §59 when the system re-
ceived negative feedback, i claim that the 
iML system was perturbed in a twofold 
manner: because its expectations did not fit 
and because its assumptions were not con-
firmed.
« 15 » Likewise, by means of perturba-
tion, the iML system was stimulated by the 
human to construct new knowledge, for ex-
ample, some criteria for validating an expec-
tation confirmation, or using our previous 
terminology, both are construing concur-
rently a new shared learning framework.
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are our limbs agents 
that need to estimate 
our intentions?
Martin Flament Fultot
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> upshot • I argue that the authors miss 
an important distinction between real-
ism and representationalism. Because of 
this, their diagnosis of the current state 
of machine learning is valid, but for the 
wrong reasons. As a consequence, their 
approach to upper limb prosthetics may 
not be a step in the right direction.
« 1 » The target article constitutes a 
positive and very welcome contribution to a 
problem that has been plaguing human-ma-
chine interaction since its inception, namely 
prosthetics. although Markus nowak, Clau-
dio Castellini and Carlo Massironi intro-
duce their reflection as being about machine 
learning (ML) in general, the particular case 
of prosthetics is of such significance that the 
authors’ ideas about the latter deserve as 
much scrutiny as their general concern with 
machine learning. This commentary will 
thus focus both on the authors’ contention 
with what they take to be the realist stance 
towards ML and on the particular study they 
chose.
« 2 » nowak et al. start by noting in 
§10 that ML tends to be used currently as 
a “number-crunching black box” the func-
tion of which is simply to yield useful map-
pings from input to output according to the 
designers’ interests. i agree with the authors’ 
lament that, very often, the meaning of the 
mappings and the processes going on in the 
machine are opaque to the designers, who 
do not seem to care. a quick and shallow 
rebuttal to this could be: “so what? There is 
nothing wrong a priori with having a com-
pletely instrumental attitude towards a par-
ticular computational tool.” But the authors 
go further and they argue that whenever the 
model fails in practice it is indeed because 
of that theoretical attitude just mentioned, 
in other words, ML models are being lim-
ited because their designers are not pay-
ing attention to deeper conceptual issues. 
Examples of such limitation are a model’s 
failure to produce the expected output or, 
as in the case of prosthetics, the dramatic 
and systematic failure to produce a satisfac-
tory coupling between human and machine, 
as exemplified by the painful figure of 75% 
rejection rate the authors rightly mention. 
This part of their assessment and critique 
seems accurate and there does seem to be a 
connection between the practical shortcom-
ings of ML and its conceptual foundations. 
However, the rest of the authors’ diagnosis 
and subsequent suggestion of a solution may 
not be so accurate.
« 3 » The main contention here is that 
nowak et al. conflate two different things 
in their critique, to wit, realism and repre-
sentationalism. to be fair, they are not the 
first ones to do this conflation, which can 
be traced back at least to Francisco varela, 
Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (1991) 
and perhaps even as far back as Edmund 
Husserl’s phenomenology. in a nutshell, the 
argument of nowak et al. is that ML fails 
because it is designed to naively attempt 
to build a statistical model of an external 
world, but for any modeling of “reality” to 
be accurate, the sample input – the exam-
ples to which the model is exposed – needs 
to be exceedingly large. We can already no-
tice here that any reasoning that reaches this 
conclusion is faced with a choice point. We 
can either blame the realist attitude of be-
lieving that there is an external world that 
the model needs to reflect, or we can blame 
the very attempt to model such a reality. Per-
haps, and this option is rather ignored by 
the authors, there is a “naive” external real-
ity, but the right approach to learning and 
knowledge in artificial intelligence, at least 
if the goal is to approach human perform-
ance or to make interaction with humans 
possible, is not that of trying to represent the 
world through a model, but rather to fit the 
world. Just like the woodpecker’s beak does 
not represent the tree – the beak is definitely 
not a model of the tree, yet it is a perfect 
complement to the tree for the purposes of 
the woodpecker (e.g., drilling a hole and 
catching termites) – ML systems could ben-
efit from not attempting to represent their 
targets but to fit them in some meaningful 
way. The problem, in short, is not trying to 
represent the world, but rather trying to rep-
resent the world.
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« 4 » interestingly, nowak et al. seem to 
have a tacit understanding of this problem, 
but i suggest that, because they fail to dis-
cern between realism and representational-
ism, they aim their criticism at the wrong 
target. For instance, following Ernst von 
Glasersfeld they claim §17 that “the value of 
an idea of the world is measured in terms 
of fitness to achieve a specific goal […], not 
in terms of the correspondence between the 
idea and a mind-independent reality.” But 
we can readily see in this statement that if 
the value of the idea resides in its ability to 
contribute to the achievement of a specific 
goal, then the content of the idea itself must 
be about achieving that goal. That, i sug-
gest, should be the reason why the authors 
contrast fitness with “correspondence” and 
not the belief that there is indeed a mind-
independent reality. again, the woodpecker 
is successful in drilling a hole in the tree 
and catching insects for its nourishment, 
not because it refuses to treat the tree as 
“bird-independent,” but because the beak 
and the muscular forces it applies to the tree 
adequately fit the latter’s material properties 
for the purpose of drilling a hole in it. Bird 
and beak are in direct contact with the tree, 
they are both complementary and fit each 
other as mathematical duals (Gibson 1979; 
shaw, Kugler & Kinsella-shaw 1990). it is 
not the tree, or the external world for that 
matter, that needs to go, but mediational 
states between it and the subject (or learning 
machine).
« 5 » Furthermore, if we give up re-
alism, it is virtually impossible to make 
sense of what the meaning of constructivist 
“perturbations” to the system are. if per-
turbations are mind-dependent and do not 
come from an external reality, then what is 
the system adapting to? But a deeper ques-
tion actually addresses the authors’ own 
concern about the meaning of what ML 
models do and the origin of that mean-
ing. Perturbations must have an independ-
ent origin at least partially if they are to be 
meaningful to the system and effective in 
driving it towards improved performance. 
But according to nowak et al., following 
their understanding of radical construc-
tivist theory, “[a]ll these processes” must 
be subjective and internal – including 
the perturbation §19 (emphasis original). 
This idea is not, however, that an idealist 
mind is generating ideal perturbations to 
its own ideal perception. The issues with 
such forms of idealism are well known. 
We must rather interpret that wherever 
the perturbations come from, they are be-
ing shaped, interpreted, idealized some-
how by the subjective agent, and they only 
make sense as perturbations to the agent 
from that subjective perspective, product 
of her own making (or construction). in-
ternal conceptual schemata – the subject’s 
pre-knowledge – are the usual posit since 
Kant, although they have not been without 
detractors (see, e.g., donald davidson’s 
well-known 1974 paper). But then again, 
even these schemata must have an origin 
and we cannot posit more regressing sub-
jects and their own schemata to account for 
them. it is revealing that the ethologist does 
not have this problem. Bird’s beak and tree 
form a closed system, they evolved together 
and interact straightforwardly perturbing 
each other. no pre-knowledge or schemata 
are needed, Jakob von uexküll’s seemingly 
constructivist concept of umwelt notwith-
standing (uexküll 2010).
« 6 » Thus, it seems that the authors’ 
move towards radical constructivism as a 
solution to the current state in ML is a right 
step, although in the wrong direction. it is a 
move towards more reliance on representa-
tion as intermediate subjective constructs, 
and that could be precisely what is crip-
pling progress in statistics-based ML. in 
the following i will address the point that, 
as a consequence of the authors’ failure to 
identify representation as the origin of the 
issues faced by ML, their proposal for pros-
thetics misses the target too.
« 7 » it is very surprising to find no 
mention at all of embodiment in the tar-
get article. Yet upper-limb prosthetics 
constitutes a proverbial problem of em-
bodiment. The challenge is to make an 
external object part of the patient’s body, 
as the lost limb used to be. But notice that 
our healthy limbs are the exact opposite of 
an autonomous subjective agent trying to 
construct an internal model of ourselves 
where all the interactions with us are “us-
er-independent.” such an idea is actually 
strikingly counter-intuitive. it is one thing 
to acknowledge that, because of the limita-
tions of prosthetics that need to be coupled 
to a body ex novo, unlike our limbs, which 
grew with us and have interacted with us 
since our fetal stage, one needs to adapt 
the prosthetic limb to the body in a very 
short time and thus some form of ML, in-
teractive or otherwise seems necessary as 
a practical necessity. it is another thing, 
however, to approach this problem, which 
is actually an unfortunate contingency, 
by making the disconnect between limb 
and body even deeper, yet that is precisely 
what the radical constructivist approach 
to prosthetic adaptation appears to imply. 
The ideal goal would be to be able to grow 
a new limb, as salamanders do, and let the 
interactions between neural, muscular and 
bony tissues adapt to one another during 
the growth process. The end result would 
be an embodied limb, one that is part of the 
subject, directly coupled to all the other 
limbs, nervous cells, etc., and certainly not 
anything that resembles a separate agent 
that interacts with us through intermediate 
mental schemata.
« 8 » Moreover, some of the negative 
consequences of nowak et al.’s second ex-
periment, namely the patient’s painful 
fatigue, are a cruel reminder that the per-
turbations a subject needs to deal with are 
quite “real,” for lack of a better term. The 
prosthetic is a massive body, and the earth 
is pulling on it through gravity. These are 
external constraints that the learning proc-
ess taking place on the side of the prosthet-
ic limb simply cannot anticipate or cope 
with. From its agential, subjective point of 
view, it is all a matter of guessing the agent’s 
intentions, constructing a model, a predic-
tive schema of EMG patterns and adapting 
to its constraints. Little does it know that 
there is a concrete living being on the other 
side struggling to produce movements by 
generating the right muscular contractions 
against torques and discomfort. But these 
muscular contractions not only need to 
deal with gravitational forces, they are also 
not meant to serve as signals for an ML-
based prosthetic limb to interpret – we do 
not move our healthy limbs through vicari-
ous muscular contractions and high-am-
plitude electric potential at the surface of 
our muscles. We move our healthy limbs by 
fitting our intentions to the external non-
muscular forces, but our intentions are em-
bodied and include the limb itself as well 
as the external force fields (Merleau-Ponty 
ar
ti
fi
ci
al
 in
te
ll
ig
en
ce
 e
xp
er
im
en
ts
 in
 r
ad
ic
al
 c
on
st
ru
ct
iv
is
m
276
 ConstRuCtivist Foundations vol. 13, n°2
1962). By applying the authors’ version of a 
radical constructivist ML solution to pros-
thetic limbs, this embodiment is lost, and 
what was a direct, high-bandwidth, logi-
cally shallow flow from intention to mo-
tor performance in the healthy coupling is 
interrupted by representations (neumann 
1958; Haugeland 1998; dreyfus 2002). The 
result is qualitatively the same as it was 
with so-called “realist” ML, because both 
the latter and what the authors take to be 
a radical constructivist ML remain repre-
sentational. Restoring the functionality of 
a lost limb, given the loss of its deeply in-
timate coupling with the rest of our body 
and nervous system, is extremely difficult. 
However, progress will hardly be made by 
establishing even more subjective discon-
tinuities between patient, prosthetic limb 
and world. on the contrary, what is needed 
is a blurring of the boundaries between 
them as much as possible and an acknowl-
edgement of the overwhelming influence of 
material constraints such as external forces, 
which are more than meaningless pertur-
bations, and can also be an active part of 
the coordination of movement (Bernstein 
1967).
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authors’ response
radical constructivism 
in machine learning: 
We Want more! Markus Nowak et al.
Markus Nowak, Claudio 
Castellini & Carlo Massironi
> upshot • Our commentators’ very con-
structive criticisms point out a number 
of weaknesses in the design of our ex-
periment, and offer insight into how 
such weaknesses might have led to the 
poor results of the experiments. We 
summarise the suggestions, which point 
in a few precise directions, and outline 
how we will try to implement them in 
the near future.
« 1 » While there seems to be general 
agreement among our commentators that 
framing interactive machine learning (iML) 
in radical constructivism (RC) is a valid 
contribution to research in machine learn-
ing (ML) and could improve the situation 
of myocontrol, they also point out that the 
experiment might have been too simple, and 
for that reason it has failed to fully prove our 
point. They all suggest improvements to 
both the setup and the experimental design, 
and it is fascinating to note that similar sug-
gestions, or at least suggestions that hint at 
similar directions, come from researchers 
who are experienced in very different fields. 
We feel inspired and will continue on this 
path, extending it further.
as simple as possible, but not 
simpler
« 2 » our working assumption was that 
rethinking myocontrol through RC would 
give hints and suggestions for the design of 
the upper-limb prosthesis of the near future. 
This intuition stemmed from our own pre-
vious work in incremental/interactive learn-
ing applied to myocontrol, for which RC 
seems to provide an ideal theoretical frame-
work, as it is rich in ideas to be applied in 
practice. so, we put in place a simple experi-
ment with three variants, each variant being 
“more radical constructivist” than the previ-
ous one, hoping that the ideas based upon 
RC would have led to a clear improvement 
in performance.
« 3 » This has turned out to hardly be 
the case. so, was our working assumption 
correct? The consensus emerging from the 
open peer commentaries that we received 
seems to indicate that it was. But at the same 
time, the general feeling is that the experi-
ment was too simple with respect to medical 
applications, and that this excess simplic-
ity has blurred the distinctions between the 
three experiments almost completely. once 
again, albert Einstein’s motto, which we 
have cited already in §40 of our target arti-
cle, is key: if you simplify too much you lose 
sight of the problem you are trying to solve, 
and you might end up finding an inadequate 
solution.
did we simplify too much?
« 4 » William craelius’s statement “The 
experiments were elegantly designed and 
executed, but the results rather disappoint-
ing” (§6) is a perfect synopsis of our work. 
His first criticism refers to the lack of pur-
pose in the tasks and therefore the lack of 
motivation for the participant. although we 
fully agree with his remedy of shaping the 
tasks in a game-like manner, some studies, 
such as one by Ludger van dijk et al. (2016), 
point out that improvements achieved in 
games using control modalities based on 
muscle signals do not necessarily trans-
fer to improvements in prosthetic control. 
craelius himself, with reference to Yungher 
& Craelius (2012), states that “a significant 
improvement in speed of 15% was achieved 
after 30 trials with their virtual assistive ro-
bot; controls, in contrast, showed negligible 
improvement with their prosthesis” (§8). 
Therefore, we chose tasks or actions that 
reflect what a user would do with her pros-
thesis, although a repetitive task might lack 
excitement for her.
« 5 » craelius issued two more criti-
cisms. Firstly, he pointed out that there 
was a lack of disabled subjects in our study. 
This is undeniably a shortcoming, as is the 
low number of participants, which we will 
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amend in the mid-term future. secondly, 
craelius stated that the residuum can accom-
modate a larger number of sensors than a 
sound limb. in our experience, though, the 
opposite seems to be the case. still, we agree 
that an increased number of sensors can 
lead to richer information about muscle ac-
tivity. When it comes to placement, our ap-
proach is to cover the whole circumference 
of the residuum rather than to target specific 
muscles. doing so is our way of dealing with 
the mentioned radical muscle and tendon 
rearrangement and disruption of synergies 
among them.
« 6 » This last criticism is shared by 
richard Weir. His lament against the non-
patient-centric view of the ML community 
(§§1f), of which we are part and parcel, is 
totally well founded. For starters, electro-
myography has a number of well-known 
downsides, and the scientific community 
has been suggesting for almost a decade now 
that novel ways to detect muscle activity in a 
residual limb should be conceived and test-
ed (Castellini 2014). We ourselves are active 
in this field so we could not agree more on 
this, but this was not the focus of this work. 
anyway, we acknowledge that using too few 
sensors (possibly of the wrong kind) would 
inevitably make sophisticated interaction 
useless – a view that all our commentators 
seem to share. improving the sensors should 
be synergistically coupled with the RC-
framed approach to iML. Furthermore, the 
lack of feedback is an issue that is present in 
the entire field of myoelectric control. so far, 
no clinical system (besides body-powered 
hooks) provides relevant feedback to the 
wearer. as yet, we ourselves have investi-
gated this topic very little.
« 7 » again, we fully agree with Weir 
(§13) that the “ML algorithm […] is not the 
determinant for success”; we rather argue 
that the ML method, whatever it is, needs 
to possess certain characteristics – at least 
incrementality, which leads to interactivity. 
The pilot study presented here makes in-
tentional use of a standard method, briefly 
mentioned in §40 of our target article. We 
solely used the low-pass filtered rectified 
amplitude of the signals. (For further details 
on the method we refer the interested reader 
to Gijsberts et al. 2014.)
« 8 » Furthermore, our work does not 
in any way challenge the effectiveness of 
the standard two-sites-of-residual-activity 
myoelectric system widely used in clinics. 
Pattern recognition (PR) potentially solves 
the issue of switching commands required 
in two-sites control, leading to “natural” 
control. From our experience, not having 
to rely on these commands would be a very 
welcome advancement for the prosthesis 
wearers; however, PR comes at a price, one 
of which being the lengthy initial calibration 
process. But the work that we present in our 
article is aimed at tackling exactly this prob-
lem: we want to eliminate the need to train 
all possible actions, in all required postures, 
for several times at once, in the beginning.
« 9 » This is exactly where interactivity 
leads to a better combined performance of 
wearer and prosthesis, following the impera-
tive: “do not collect more data, rather collect 
better data.” in Experiment 2 for example, 
we started with an empty model (no training 
data at all) and updates only occurred when, 
and if, required. Repeating all gestures in all 
postures, as mentioned by Weir (“moving 
from one posture to another may result in 
overlapping muscle activity patterns,” §10), 
is exactly what the RC-framed iML should 
avoid.
« 10 » all in all, the picture starts to 
emerge – myocontrol could be a paradig-
matically holistic problem: either you solve 
all its aspects at once, or you will not be able 
to solve it at all. Therefore, all suggestions we 
received (design more engaging tasks; im-
prove the sensors; improve interaction; and 
give feedback) need to be taken into account 
collectively. peter cariani, starting from his 
conceptual background and his research 
agenda as a physiologist, gets to a similar 
conclusion. He compares the physiology 
of motor control under natural vs. experi-
mental conditions and suggests enriching 
the human-machine interaction by adding 
more observables, actions, and feedbacks 
available to both the machine and the hu-
man, such as incorporating proprioceptive 
and tactile feedback signals from artificial 
hands and arms into prosthetic controllers. 
The grand goal is that of reproducing the 
wealth of bidirectional flow of information 
taking place in intact subjects: a large num-
ber of sensory channels, significant proprio-
ceptive feedback, tactile feedback, copies 
of the command signals that are activating 
muscles.
« 11 » Regarding cariani’s questions 
about the usage of the normalised root mean 
squared error: the nRMsE was used only as 
an a posteriori inter-subjective measure of 
the accuracy of the system and it played no 
role whatsoever in the selection of the train-
ing data. The training feedback was always 
and only that provided by the subject (Q1). 
We confirm that in this case the feedback 
could have easily been replaced by a thresh-
old posed on the nRMsE itself (Q2), which 
is what usually is done in the field of myo-
control – for instance when using the target 
achievement Control test as described by 
ann simon et al. (2011). actually, from the 
point of view of the engineer, this is a very 
unusual characteristic of our experimental 
protocol: to employ a subjective judgment 
to determine whether a task was successful 
or not, instead of an inter-subjectively verifi-
ably measure. We ourselves have used such 
measures in the past.
« 12 » Particularly fascinating in cari-
ani’s commentary is the idea that the initial 
choice of observables, actions and feedbacks 
determines a cognitive “cage” in which the 
ML system is trapped – and since we have 
had no chance so far to design a ML system 
that evolves its own sensors and actuators, 
the cage remains as it is for the rest of the ex-
periment and plays a key role in its outcome.
« 13 » There is an unfortunate practical 
implication of cariani’s idea: any prosthetic 
system endowed with insufficient hardware 
will never get to a satisfactory level of inte-
gration and performance, no matter how 
smart the ML method and/or the interac-
tion schema is – one more hint at the holistic 
nature of myocontrol. Things are made even 
worse by the extremely high acceptance 
threshold in the field, as pointed out by Weir 
(§3), who, by the way, also touches upon this 
“cannot-neglect-the-hardware” conundrum 
when he says:
“ it is the limited number of control sites and the 
associated limit on the number of controllable 
doF [degrees of freedom] that led investigators to 
explore other means of acquiring and using multi-
doF control schemes such as ML. users certainly 
want more doFs, but not if it is a hassle.” (§5)
« 14 » cariani’s view is that human-ma-
chine interaction can be seen as two adap-
tive, purposive percept-coordination-action 
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systems, in which the data collection should 
be even more dependent on the evaluative 
feedback to the machine than in our simple 
experiment. Here too, we could not agree 
more.
attention and culture
« 15 » More ideas and suggestions, par-
ticularly focussing on the interaction, are to 
be found in the remaining commentaries. 
starting from an exquisitely radical con-
structivist perspective and adopting our 
research agenda as a working hypothesis, 
marco Bettoni offers some useful linguistic/
conceptual suggestions and two operational 
models. Bettoni suggests operating a concep-
tual switch from organising perceptual ob-
jects to organising a sensory field and then, 
after having constructed a conceptual ob-
ject, assigning the object not to the sensory 
field but rather to the “experiential reality” 
(a higher operational level). We definitely 
agree with his suggestions, particularly with 
the request to avoid using the word “match” 
altogether, “even when it refers to sensory 
patterns or conceptual structures and not to 
pictures of the physical world” (§11).
« 16 » From a sociocultural perspective, 
marco guicciardi argues that human-machine 
interaction loops must be grounded in spe-
cific social practices, culturally and histori-
cally situated (repeated experiential inter-
action loops are not enough). in designing 
our experiments, we have already tried to 
enrich the socio-cultural dimension with 
respect to a classical experimental setting by 
working on the dimension of meaning, and 
on the mutual roles of human and machine: 
designing meanings for the interaction and 
inventing reciprocal roles for human and 
machine.
« 17 » still, guicciardi goes even further, 
suggesting giving the iML system the capac-
ity to grasp the “frame” of the interaction 
(the rich context), to uncover the meaning 
(culturally and historically situated) of a ges-
ture. His suggestions are twofold: we should 
give the iML system the capacity to grasp the 
sociocultural context of the interaction; at 
the same time, we should enable the partici-
pant to be more aware of the iML system’s 
knowledge constructs; and both should have 
the capacity to create together new knowl-
edge outside the original social context 
where distances, shapes and sizes are cul-
turally defined. in order to provide at least 
a partial answer to his Q1, one initial move 
in this direction is to diversify and enhance 
the sensor modalities available to the iML 
system – not only to have more sensors of a 
specific kind, but also more different kinds 
of sensors relating to different kinds of data. 
For instance, there could be feedback from 
the device, environmental information, a 
more articulated dialogue between the pros-
thesis and the participant and a skilled way 
of extracting information from it. in this 
sense, it is likely that the more data, the bet-
ter, provided that the iML system is able to 
discern the relevant information from that 
which is irrelevant.
as salamanders do?
« 18 » Finally, martin flament fultot starts 
from a non-representationalist concep-
tual background, à la “intelligence without 
representation” (Brooks 1991), mixing be-
haviourism and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology. flament fultot’s research 
agenda is extremely different from ours:
“ The ideal goal would be to be able to grow a 
new limb, as salamanders do, and let the interac-
tions between neural, muscular and bony tissues 
adapt to one another during the growth process. 
The end result would be an embodied limb.” 
(§7)
as he clearly states, he is not interested in 
trying to build “anything that resembles a 
separate agent that interacts with us through 
intermediate mental schemata” (ibid), as we, 
instead, are.
« 19 » For instance, in §3, flament fultot 
suggests trying not to represent the world 
through a model, but rather to fit the world 
just like the woodpecker’s beak fits the tree. 
But what is meant by representation here? in 
ML it is customary to do away with this con-
cept by blurring the distinction between a 
representation and, for example, the weights 
of a neural network. These two positions do 
not clash with each other, rather they start 
from two completely different definitions of 
a representation. For instance, we agree with 
flament fultot about stressing the concept of 
fitting, but we are definitely not interested in 
equipping the iML system with the capacity 
to build a “true representation” of the world. 
Rather, our ideal iML system should just 
organise its sensory field to build its experi-
ential reality (see Bettoni’s commentary and 
our response above).
« 20 » surprisingly, there is a final point 
of strong agreement between flament fultot 
and us, and this is the concept of embodi-
ment, or more precisely having the prosthesis 
feel like a part of the patient’s body. This con-
cept is slowly finding its way in the human-
robot-interaction community, too, due to 
the intuition that control will improve as the 
user embodies the prosthesis. such embodi-
ment can only be realised via technologies 
that are not yet in sight, including extreme 
mechatronic dexterity, detailed feedback 
with sensory substitution, and close-to-
perfect myocontrol. Given the current state 
of the art, for this experiment we have in-
stead chosen to make the prosthesis a better, 
friendly, more responsive, tool/buddy, but in 
the future an upper-limb prosthesis will be 
used like a pair of glasses: don it and it works 
fine, doff it and go to sleep, don it again the 
next morning and it will work again just like 
yesterday – see Weir’s remark at §8. The road 
to embodiment is still very long, but we view 
our attempt as a small step towards that goal.
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